Countries are commonly expected to make a distinction between refugees and migrants when setting policies for these two groups of people within their borders. Refugees are protected in international conventions and governments are obliged to treat them in accordance with international norms and commitments to refugee protection and asylum (UNHCR, 2016). Migrants on the other hand can be dealt with under national immigration laws and processes (UNHCR, 2019) on the assumption that unlike refugees, they have left their country of their own accord, mainly in pursuit of economic opportunities or for education, family or other reasons.

For years now, Jordan has been experiencing a tremendous influx of people in both groups. In 2017, the total number of immigrants and refugees in Jordan was over 3.2 million, which was about one-third of the population (10.05 million in 2017) and 19% greater than in 2010 (Figure 1). The number of illegal immigrants (workers without a permit) is estimated to be about twice as high as the officially registered number (680 000 and 352 350, respectively)[17] NRF A.3.2
, the majority being immigrants of working age from Egypt (54%), Syria (12%) and other countries (34%)[18] NRF B.1.3
.

Figure 1. Total number of immigrants and refugees by age group (2010, 2015, 2017)

Image

Source: ETF database and United Nation Population Division. Trends in International Migrant Stock, 2017 revision (UN database)

Owing to its proximity to areas in turmoil, Jordan has been a traditional destination for refugees, mostly from Palestine, Iraq and Syria. According to data from the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees (UNRWA), Jordan hosted over 2.1 million Palestinians as of 2016. In addition, the Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in Jordan had registered 655 732 refugees from Syria and 61 405 from Iraq as of 2017[19] NRF A.3.2
(Figure 2). There are also refugees from Yemen and Libya.

Figure 2. Total number of UNHCR-registered refugees and asylum seekers by year (2015–2018)

Image

Source: ETF database and UNHCR–Jordan

Jordan is not a signatory to the 1951 UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, but it has traditionally remained open to forced migrants and it has put in place policies to ease their stay in the country and even to integrate some of them (e.g. Palestinian refugees). In 2016 in response to the Syrian refugee crisis, the country also launched the Jordan Response Plan for the Syria Crisis 2016–2018, which commits to allowing Syrian refugees to work and carry out trade inside and outside the refugee camps (Athamneh, 2016).

In addition to measures aimed at regulating the legal status of refugees and their access to the labour market, Jordanian authorities have also prioritised access to education and training as a support measure. With the help of the international donor community, Syrian refugees have (paid) access to VET programmes and free-of-charge access to general education. According to the national report, some 115 681 young people (of which 55% were female) benefited in 2017 from life skills programmes provided by UNICEF Jordan and its partners in camps and host communities, and close to 500 youth (half were female) began certified vocational training[20] NRF C.1.2
. In addition, the response plan in support of Syrian refugees includes projects that focus on employment creation, including job matching and employability services, vocational training and apprenticeships, and career counselling services designed to increase access to decent work opportunities[21] NRF C.1.4
.

The readiness of Jordanian authorities to accept and continue accepting foreign nationals in need of refuge and/or economic opportunity is commendable. Nonetheless, there are also challenges that prevent migrants and refugees from contributing to the Jordanian economy and labour market to the fullest extent.

One problem is the capacity of Jordan's public budget and its education and training system to absorb the vast number of refugees and effectively address the diversity of their needs. Another problem is that immigration appears to deplete the stock of human capital available to the economy instead of replenishing it, as immigrants to Jordan are considerably less skilled than the Jordanians who leave the country in the search of economic opportunities abroad. Finally, most refugees and migrants in Jordan tend to find employment in the informal sector. This promotes informality as a widespread form of employment, helps to establish a norm of precarious working conditions (e.g. lower pay), and diminishes the attractiveness of employment in the private sector for jobseekers from Jordan. The next sections look at each of these problems in more detail.

Refugees continue to be a major socio-economic challenge for Jordan. For one thing, most of those fleeing the Syrian conflict (51%) are youth below the age of 18, they come from households headed by women, and most of the households are classified as extremely poor[22] NRF A.3.2
. These demographic and socio-economic characteristics complicate their participation in the Jordanian economy and society, because for years now, Jordan has been struggling to boost the economic participation of the very same segments of its own population: youth, women, and people from socio-economically disadvantaged backgrounds.

The large proportion of young people among the refugees also creates pressure for additional investment in the provision of key services such as education and training, which can be a difficult task when resources are limited. The decision of authorities to authorise refugees to live outside the refugee camps is straining the capacity of numerous communities in Jordan to provide education, healthcare and water supply services and address local unemployment. In 2016, the latest year for which there are relevant data, only 17.4% of Palestinian refugees and 18.2% of Syrian refugees were still living in official refugee camps (Athamneh, 2016). In the course of only a few years up to 2016, the number of Syrian students enrolled in public schools grew almost ninefold to over 143 000[23] NRF C.1.2
.

Migration can be a source of enrichment and diversification of a country's human capital. In Jordan, however, it appears to be gradually reducing the stock of skills available to employers. Immigrants to Jordan outnumber those who leave the country by a factor of four (in 2019 there were 3 346 703 immigrants and 784 377 emigrants), but most of those who leave the country are highly qualified (about 85% have completed tertiary education), while those who replace them are mostly unskilled or semi-skilled[24] NRF B.1.3
.

Despite the positive aspects of migration such as remittances, these developments and data describe a textbook case of brain drain. The problem is amplified by the absence of policies and measures in support of circular migration, the limited opportunities for the upskilling of guest workers, and the lack of proper recognition of their prior, non-formal and informal learning. At the time of this assessment, the skills of immigrants could be tested only upon an official request from the Ministry of Labour for each immigrant separately[25] NRF B.1.8
or in accordance with project-related agreements with international organisations and agencies that provide training to Syrian refugees[26] NRF A.1.6
.

Refugees are not allowed to work in Jordan and it is very difficult for them to obtain a work permit (Athamneh, 2016). Combined with the lack of options to earn legitimate income and the risk of poverty, this situation forces many refugees into the informal economy. As already noted, the Jordanian labour market employed around 680 000 illegal workers in 2018. Most were refugees from Syria, but there were also illegal workers from Egypt. At the same time, workers from Egypt also represent the biggest group of legally employed foreign nationals in Jordan[27] NRF A.3.2 and A.1.1
.

The national report suggests that the large number of immigrant and refugee workers creates a competition for jobs that limits the employment opportunities of Jordanians[28] NRF B.1.3
. However, the impact of foreign workers on the domestic labour market is likely to be more complex. Jordanian nationals are traditionally more interested in public-sector employment or in private-sector employment that offers conditions that are close to those on offer in the public sector in terms of stability, working time, and prestige (ETF, 2016a). For the most part, these jobs are off-limits to refugees and immigrants.

The contribution of immigrants and refugees to the proliferation of informality in the labour market is a bigger cause for concern. Even before the Syrian refugee crisis, the informal sector in Jordan accounted for over one-quarter of GDP,[29] NRF B.1.1
and the share is likely to be even higher today. This leads to foregone income for the public budget in the form of taxes and makes it difficult to pursue evidence-based employment policies, such as skills forecasts, since employers and employees have an incentive to hide information about the actual state of affairs in their professional setting, which in turn undermines the reliability of labour market data and projections.

Informality and otherwise illegal employment also contribute to the establishment of substandard working conditions as the norm. The informal sector pushes down wages and diminishes the attractiveness of work in the private sector, which in turn fuels the preference of Jordanian nationals for jobs in the public sector, which are scarce and getting scarcer. In this sense it is true that illegal workers contribute to official unemployment in Jordan, albeit not by taking away jobs but rather by encouraging employers to offer substandard working conditions in the private sector even in times of economic growth.

The first challenge is the sheer number of reform commitments, which may be overstretching the capacity of the education and training sector to coordinate and absorb the envisaged changes. The key strategic documents that address the TVET sector in Jordan[30] NRF A.2.4
– the National Agenda 2006–2015, the National Employment Strategy 2011–2020, the National E-TVET Strategy 2014–2020, and the National Human Resources Development Strategy 2016–2025 (NHRD) – describe a wide range of actions and initiatives, many of which imply profound changes in the ways that the TVET sector is set up and is supposed to operate and cooperate with external stakeholders.

For instance, the National Agenda envisages a restructuring of the institutional framework through which VET contributes to the employability of people of working age, the development of targeted programmes to reduce unemployment among people with special needs, an increase in female workforce participation, an increase in private-sector involvement in VET, the establishment of several high-level coordination councils, and curriculum reform. In addition, the National Employment Strategy commits to revisions of the boards of key players in the governance of VET, such as the (now defunct) Employment, Technical and Vocational Education and Training (ETVET) Council and the Accreditation and Quality Assurance Commission for Higher Education Institutions (AQACHEI), and it commits to expanding VET programmes for direct on-the-job training in the private sector.

The E-TVET strategy in turn describes plans to improve the governance of TVET, the relevance of its outputs, the degree of inclusiveness of TVET programmes, their systems of quality measurement, and the sustainability of TVET funding. More recently, the NHRD has committed to the creation of new pathways towards tertiary VET; an increase in the quality of TVET by aligning the standards for teacher training and quality assurance for all providers; an increase in accountability through better governance; and the creation of more innovative forms of funding and TVET delivery.

The national report suggests that the implementation of many of these commitments thus far has been only partial. Some priorities have been delayed and others completely abandoned[31] See National Employment Strategy and NRF A.2.4.
, while action plans are regularly drafted, but not always implemented (ETF, 2017). Also, owing to a lack of capacity and awareness, many of the more innovative solutions or resources, such as e-learning and data on career guidance, have not actually been adopted or used by TVET providers[32] NRF B.1.2
.

The second long-standing challenge is the centralised focus of reform plans, which for the most part are designed, adopted and operationalised in a centralised, top-down manner with a primary focus on the capital Amman and do not involve much consultation with regional stakeholders and providers or with middle to low-level managers and decision-makers in TVET.

One aspect of the problem is insufficient engagement and communication about reforms with the parents and communities that TVET providers serve. This may also be the reason why some reports suggest that most reform interventions are procedural and not substantive in nature, which may further complicate improvement. There are also shortcomings in the communication among central-level institutions that bear responsibility for the implementation of reform plans (ETF, 2016a; OCHA, 2017).

The third and final challenge to the effectiveness and continuity of reforms is the Syrian refugee crisis. Although the influx of refugees is a development that lies beyond the control of authorities and TVET stakeholders, their presence has a profound impact on the education and training system. It forces a shift in attention to the immediate daily needs of the TVET system and away from longer-term aspirations for change. According to some reports, the number of Syrian children enrolled in schools is the main cause of additional barriers that affect the quality of the learning environment and the achievements that Jordan has thus far attained during the reform process (OCHA, 2017).