# LEBANON

## EDUCATION, TRAINING AND EMPLOYMENT DEVELOPMENTS 2016

## KEY EDUCATION, TRAINING AND EMPLOYMENT DEVELOPMENTS IN LEBANON

Lebanon has a unique socio political setting due to the fragile institutional situation and the growing pressure of the Syrian crisis. The country's unique features of a confession-based political system and challenging geopolitical environment have made it difficult for governments to implement reforms, which are often blocked or slowed down due to changing priorities and problems in reaching consensus. Parliamentary elections have been postponed to 2017 due to a political deadlock over redesigning the electoral law. The government has been acting without approved budgets for many years. Starting in May 2014, attempts to elect the new President repeatedly failed. Finally, on 31 October 2016 in the 46th round, Michel Aoun, a Member of Parliament and former Prime Minister and Acting President in a rival government near the end of the Lebanese Civil War, was elected with 83 votes in parliament.

Due to the current political situation, attention is focused on security and on providing a solid response to the Syrian crisis, which is putting tremendous socioeconomic pressure on the country. The London conference, entitled *Supporting Syria and the Region*, took place in February 2016. It resulted in the proposal of a comprehensive support package, which needs to be further discussed in order to establish the EU-Lebanon Compact. The Mobility Partnership with the European Union (EU) is expected to be signed in autumn 2016.

Several attempts have been made to develop a strategy for vocational education and training (VET). To date, however, nothing has been adopted or agreed that would enable national authorities to define priorities of intervention, informed decision making, efficient allocation of resources and clear accountability for achieving results. Furthermore, there is no strategy for human resources development or employment.

# 1. Key demographic and economic characteristics

Demographics in Lebanon are characterised by two factors: a young population and the inflow of displaced persons from Syria. The young population (15 to 24 years) accounts for almost 30% of the labour force (15 to 64 years). The ratio of 15 to 24 year-olds to the working age population (15 to 64 year-olds) has decreased since 2011, which means that the estimated population is slightly older than in the recent past.

Lebanon's national statistics office (Central Administration of Statistics (CAS)) estimated the country's total population to be 3.7 million in 2007. However, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), which includes the Palestinian population living in refugee camps and displaced Syrians who have reached the country, estimated the population to be 5.8 million in 2015[1]. According to the UNDP, the inflow of displaced persons from Syria was about 1.3 million in 2015. The unprecedented influx of Syrian refugees (around 1.2 million registered with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)), the largest in Lebanese history, has impacted on the already-changing demography of Lebanon (see Box 1 on the Syrian crisis). An additional challenge has been the arrival of around 40 000 Palestinian refugees from Syria (UNRWA, 2016). This has worsened the precarious situation of the 'host community' of Palestinian refugees already residing in Lebanon (around 270 000 who benefit from the services of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), placing already scarce resources, infrastructure and services under additional strain.

[1] UNDP, *World population prospects*, 2015

Lebanese society has been always shaped by migration flows, primarily linked to the country's sociopolitical developments. In the past, emigration was mainly a consequence of war. More recently, it is linked to general instability in the region and increasing unemployment. Immigration has been largely characterised by regional political developments and to a lesser extent by work-related issues (mainly domestic workers coming from Syria, Egypt, Bangladesh and Sudan).

Lebanon is a middle-income country with an open and largely service-oriented economy. It has a strong commercial tradition of domestic free trade and investment policies. The service sector accounts for 73.8% of the country's gross domestic product (GDP), followed by industry (20.7%) and agriculture (5.6%) (World Bank, 2015). Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) remain the main form of business organisation, particularly micro and small enterprises. There is also a large informal sector in the country. Economic growth was high in recent years (up to 8% or 9% although this was mostly a jobless recovery) but has dropped significantly since 2011 and the forecast for the near future is not promising (1.5% in 2015 (World Bank)). In fact, economic growth is still slow due to political instability, the global financial crisis, the regional political situation and the impact of the ongoing conflict in neighbouring Syria. Factors that influence this limited growth are also linked to limited public and private investment, particularly in the productive sectors, and overall limited international and domestic competitiveness (Lebanon dropped from 89th place in the Global Competitiveness Index 2013–2014 to 101st place in the 2015–2016 index).

Lebanon has lost an important trading partner as a result of the Syrian crisis. The World Bank estimates that real GDP growth would have been 2.8% higher in the absence of the Syrian crisis. At the same time, government expenditure incurred in response to the crisis is expected to rise while government revenue is expected to decline, causing a fiscal deficit of around USD 2.8 billion in the period 2012–2014[2]. The trends in international trade show that service exports have decreased dramatically since the beginning of the Syrian crisis in 2011. While product exports show a lower absolute decline as of 2012, the decline is substantial in relative terms. Moreover, it is interesting to note that there has been a decline in product imports since 2013 when, arguably, the population has increased significantly as a result of the refugee influx (it is possible that the balance of trade has been sensitevely affected by the crisis in Syria).

# 2. Education and training

## 2.1 Trends and challenges

Traditionally, Lebanon retains high education standards, despite difficult periods of instability. Public expenditure on education was estimated at 2.56% of GDP in 2013 and 8.6% of total public expenditure (UNESCO Institute for Statistics). It should be noted that private education features strongly in the education system.

An enrolment rate of above 50% in private education has also been a traditional characteristic of vocational education and training (VET), but the trend seems to have reversed in recent years. This may be due to the unwillingness of parents to pay high fees for private VET education. VET is perceived socially as a second chance, with limited chances of getting employment, and once employed, the salary and working conditions are not satisfactory.

Overall enrolment in VET has been increasing and is expected to grow further in response to skills shortages and a young population seeking employment opportunities. The gross enrolment rate was 68.2% in secondary education and 57.9% in upper secondary education in 2013 (latest available

[2] ILO, 2015.

data). In the same year, the share of VET students was 14.8% of secondary enrolment and 27.3% of upper secondary enrolment (UNESCO Institute for Statistics). While the number of students choosing VET in upper secondary has increased due to the increase in population, the proportion of students in upper secondary who go to VET has decreased over time.

The limited attractiveness of the system results in limited public investment. The VET budget accounted for 0.5% of the total government budget in 2009[3]. Other than minor expenses, schools have no say in how their budget is managed and they cannot engage in profit-making activities. The limited attractiveness of the VET system can also be attributed to the weak links with the labour market, which has led to a growing imbalance between the overall supply of and demand for labour and consequently an increase in unemployment. The system also suffers from an uneven geographical distribution of schools across the country. The increase in the number of schools does not seem to be directly linked to local labour market and skills needs but rather to political and religious considerations which have also been influenced by the Syrian crisis in recent years.

In addition to the long-term challenge associated with the teaching staff, other challenges put pressure on the system. The curricula are outdated and there is no pedagogical support. Work-based learning is limited to the dual system, which was introduced by GIZ, a German development agency. This is now one of the streams offered by the VET system although it provides a different type of qualification to that provided by other educational institutions. The EU CLOSER project, funded in the amount of EUR 3 million, currently supports practice orientation and work-based learning in VET provision in Lebanon.

A major issue for Lebanon is the dramatic increase in the number of Syrian students in the Lebanese formal education system in the past five years. Since 2012, Lebanese public schools and universities have allowed Syrian refugees to enrol. In July 2015, the Ministry of Education and Higher Education introduced an Accelerated Learning Programme aimed at Syrian children aged 9 to 17. At the end of January 2016, over 472 000 Syrian refugee children between the ages of 3 and 17 were registered with the UNHCR in Lebanon. Of these, 157 984 students were enrolled in formal education for the 2015/2016 academic year in grades 1 to 9, mainly thanks to double shifts[4]. In July 2016, however, Human Rights Watch reported that more than 250 000 Syrian refugee school-age children were still not in the formal education system. Older children are particularly affected: of the 82 744 registered Syrian refugees aged between 15 and 18 as of August 2015, less than 3% enrolled in public secondary schools during the 2015-2016 school year[5].

Commendable efforts were made by the Ministry of Education and Higher Education and education sector stakeholders to respond to the Syrian crisis in the last four years. These were structured via the Reaching All Children with Education (RACE) Response Plan 2013–2016. RACE is the umbrella emergency plan designed to ensure coordination among donors. With a core vision to provide education opportunities to all children in Lebanon who have been affected by the Syrian crisis, RACE I (2014–2016) was developed from the No Lost Generation initiative. RACE I focused on increasing affected children's access to quality educational opportunities through a variety of means, most notably the subsidy of primary school enrolment fees and the structuring of tailored, non-formal education programmes. The next phase of the programme, RACE II (2017–2021), is currently under preparation. RACE II will seek to build on the success of RACE I and will be structured around three pillars: access, quality and system strengthening.

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[3] ETF, *Mapping vocational education and training governance in Lebanon*, 2014

[4] UNHRC Lebanon, *Back to school*, 2016

[5] Human Rights Watch, *Growing without education: Barriers to education for Syrian refugee children in Lebanon*, July 2016

Lebanon suffers from a lack of recent data. Most of the available data is provided by CAS or donor databases. As most of the data refers to 2009, and no later figures are available, progress is difficult to assess. In addition, the data available on education and employment is widely considered to be controversial.

Since no monitoring or evaluation systems are in place, it is difficult to assess the overall impact that training programmes have on skills development and employability. The high level of fragmentation and the lack of a coordinated strategy or approach also impacts on the efficiency of the training programmes.

## 2.2 Education and training policy and institutional setting

The National Education Strategy Framework and related Education Sector Development Plan (2010–2015) has not been followed by a new strategy covering 2016 onwards. A strategy to reform the education system (excluding VET) was approved in 2010 and is still being implemented.

A VET action plan was approved in 2011. The plan provides a clear sign of renewed interest in VET and constitutes a potential basis for more structured discussion with an extended group of VET actors. However, the current sociopolitical instability and limited resources (both financial and human) have resulted in delayed execution.

VET is primarily the responsibility of the Ministry of Education and Higher Education under the Directorate-General for VET (DG VET). The DG VET is responsible for both initial and continuing VET (IVET and CVET). In addition to standard VET courses, the DG VET organises short courses (as part of the Accelerated Learning Programme). These courses are organised in existing VET schools in the afternoons or evenings. However, in reality, the CVET offer within the DG VET is limited.

The main body offering adult education and continuing training courses is the National Employment Office (NEO), which operates under the auspices of the Ministry of Labour. The Chamber of Commerce, Industry and Agriculture also offers training courses through its own centres.

Training offered by the NEO is outsourced to private providers and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and is aimed at both unemployed and disabled people. These training courses are the main form of active labour market programme provided in Lebanon for both unemployed and disabled people. A new phenomenon is the proliferation of private accelerated training service providers: NGOs or companies that have their own curricula and training schemes and thus are not connected to or supervised by the DG VET. On the other hand, there is no single entity that provides accreditation and certification: the Ministry of Labour, NEO and DG VET each provide their own official accreditation, without collaboration. This results in a variation in the technical capacities of training graduates and more often an inability to cope with the highly evolving labour market.

In order to be consistent with international practice, to create more flexible pathways between general education and higher education and to establish a system of credit for VET, Decree No 8590 was approved in 2013 to reform the way in which VET fields, phases and certificates are organised. The main objective of the decree was to bring the VET system closer to the general and higher education system. However, while pathways exist for VET graduates to move to the dual system stream, no pathways exist for dual system graduates to go back to the VET system.

The decree also reduced the number of years needed to acquire the qualifications of ‘technicien supérieur’ and ‘licence technique’. Consequently, problems have arisen linked to the adaptation of the programmes, which so far have not been addressed.

Since these qualifications remain largely based on theoretical subjects with little or very limited practical skills, most VET graduates move to higher education and do not enter the world of work.

The main challenge for Lebanon remains the implementation of the reforms. The decision-making system is closely linked to the established balance of powers between religious groups at all levels of the system. Therefore, while society and the business community move swiftly and respond quickly to the changing socioeconomic environment, governmental structures remain slow and in some cases paralysed. This specificity of Lebanon also influences the education reforms and the education system. Given the current situation, the education system is not in a position to foresee solutions or to consider proposals from the international community that could support this very much needed reform process.

# 3. Labour market and employment

## 3.1 Trends and challenges

The Lebanese labour market is characterised by low activity and employment rates, a low contribution by women to economic life, a large informal sector, a high influx of foreign workers and a large number of skilled Lebanese people seeking employment abroad.

The most recent national official labour market data date from 2009. A labour force survey (LFS) financed by the EU and implemented by CAS with the technical support of the International Labour Organisation (ILO) should be ready in the course of 2016, and should clarify the employment situation in the country. In recent years, the ILO has supported the NEO in establishing a labour market information system, although the resources currently allocated are insufficient for the office to fulfil its mandate. All analyses need to be based on international projections or studies until the new LFS is available.

According to 2009 data, the Lebanese labour market[6] is characterised by a low participation of females (employment rate of 66.9% for males and 25.3% for females; activity rate of 55.4% for males and 23.5% for females) and high youth unemployment (18% for males and 20.4% for females). The low employment and low activity rates of females are attributed to social, cultural and economic factors. The largest share of employed women work as professionals such as university lecturers, teachers, doctors and engineers. Female activity rates increase with education level. While female participation in entrepreneurship is relatively high in Lebanon, the number of women in the top category of managers (senior officials) remains low, with only 7% of working women in this occupation (as opposed to 16% of working men)[7].

According to Eurostat, the total unemployment rate was 9.7% in 2012; 7.7% for males and 13.8% for females). The World Bank indicates a slightly better figure for the same year (6.2%), and a stable trend up to 2014 (6.4%). International calculations (ILO, 2015) show that the reduction in the total unemployment rate as of 2007 seems to be accompanied by an increase in the female unemployment rate. Unemployment rates are particularly high among university graduates, which also indicates a significant mismatch between labour supply and demand. In fact, in most cases, the increasingly higher educational attainment of the labour force does not match the needs of micro and small enterprises, which still constitute the backbone of the national economy. Approximately 12 000 to 15 000 new jobs per year have been generated in the last 10 years but this has not been enough to satisfy the new entrants to the labour market (approximately 23 000 per year). The majority of jobs created are in trade, services and construction, most of them in low-productivity sectors (World Bank). High expectations among young graduates, lack of relevance of the qualifications and weak labour market governance structures also play a role in exacerbating graduate unemployment.

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[6] Labour market data refers to 2012 (Eurostat).

[7] UNESCO, 2015

The labour market is affected by the large size of the informal sector while the share of self-employment as a percentage of total employment has decreased in recent years from 36.9% to 28.9% (in 2009 and 2012 respectively (Eurostat)). In addition, the share of the labour force that does not contribute to social security increased to 66.9% among all workers[8].

Despite the unavailability of data (or different data sources), labour market trends do not seem to be promising, with unemployment on the rise and a weak economic performance. This is due to multiple reasons, including the closure of the Syrian border, the subsequent increase in export costs and the shrinking work opportunities associated with weak economic growth. The World Bank estimates that some 200 000 additional Lebanese have been pushed into poverty as a result of the Syrian crisis, adding to the former 1 million poor. An additional 220 000 to 320 000 Lebanese citizens are estimated to have become unemployed, most of them unskilled young people.

## 3.2 Employment policy and institutional setting

The various institutions in charge of employment-related matters are fragmented and have limited coordination mechanisms and limited resources to fulfil their mandates. The Ministry of Labour is responsible for labour-related legislation and policies, including employment conditions, labour relations and labour inspection. Its role should be strengthened and resources increased in order to allow it to play a pivotal role. Updated and reliable data on the labour market and the means to carry out wider consultations should also be put at its disposal to conduct effective labour market policies[9].

The NEO was established in 1977. Its purpose is to offer job matching and counselling services and to deliver vocational training by subcontracting NGOs. Its remit also covers some labour market research[10]. According to its mandate, it should cover a much broader range of services but it does not have the capacity to be fully operational due to severe staff shortages, limited budget availability (the budget has not changed since 2005) and very few offices throughout the country (Beirut, Tripoli and Sidon)[11]. Laws regulating the NEO have not been reviewed since the 1970s. It has been negatively impacted due to an extreme shortage of government and external funds and needs comprehensive reform provisions to be able to use anticipation and matching tools to adapt its training provision to labour market needs and ensure a proper career guidance system. The Ministry of Labour is now willing to reactivate the NEO's functions and its offices and is currently preparing a dedicated plan with the support of the World Bank. As only outdated information on the labour market is available, the office is largely unable to present relevant responses to labour market challenges in terms of skills provision and the matching of demand and supply.

The training courses organised through the NEO are the main form of active labour market programme (ALMP) provided in Lebanon for both unemployed and disabled people. Another government institution involved in the provision of training-related ALMPs is the Vocational Training Centre, which operates under the auspices of the Ministry of Labour and the Ministry of Social Affairs. It provides short vocational training programmes in 58 of its social development centres. Most of the training programmes provided are supply driven and tend to be disconnected from private sector demands. To a large extent, programmes are based on in-class training and rarely involve on-the-job

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[8] World Bank, *The challenge of informality in the Middle East and North Africa*, 2011

[9] ILO, 2015

[10] The NEO's objectives include conducting studies and research to formulate employment policies for Lebanon; improve the employability and skill level of new entrants to the labour force through accelerated vocational training; find job opportunities for jobseekers through the employment office in order to reduce unemployment rates; and build the capacities of people with disabilities in order to increase their employability.

[11] A total of 108 positions exist, only 27 vacancies are filled; 12 of these positions are purely administrative.

training or internships. The various private institutions and NGOs also provide overlapping courses of different durations. However, their value in the labour market is unknown.

Private employment agencies are increasingly gaining ground in Lebanon, but mainly offer services to migrant workers coming to work in Lebanon. Attempts have been made to regulate these agencies, especially those dealing with domestic workers, but Lebanon has not yet ratified ILO Convention 181 on Private Employment Agencies (1997) and Convention 189 on Decent Work for Domestic Workers (2011).

As part of the Governance for Employability in the Mediterranean (GEMM) initiative funded by the EU and implemented by the ETF, the project aimed at establishing Guidance Employment Offices (GEOs) in six public schools in Lebanon to support the transition from school to work for VET graduates. At the end of 2015, one office was fully operational, while another six GEO officers were trained and ready to provide GEO services from the beginning of 2016.

There are no structured or consolidated mechanisms in place to identify skills needs and to match skills supply. At present, there are no systematic school-to-work transition surveys. Matching tools, such as enterprise surveys and anticipatory mechanisms, are used on an ad hoc basis. Most of the existing surveys and analyses are performed with the financial support of donors and are not repeated over time. Hence, the system lacks the instruments needed to gain an understanding of the problems associated with the transition from education to work and the real needs of the economy.

The mismatch between the skills available and the needs of the economy has therefore not been well studied and is poorly understood. It results mainly from a mismatch between an increasingly educated workforce and an underdeveloped economic structure that is characterised mostly by micro and small enterprises, a lack of innovativeness and repetitive simple processes. This gap means that, instead of exporting specialised products and services, the country tends to export specialised manpower, therefore generating little added value for the economy apart from remittances.

The limited dialogue with social partners and the business sector in particular remains a key problem for the planning and delivery of programmes addressing the skills mismatch. There has been little progress so far in developing a clear policy framework for the concrete and structured involvement of business representatives in educational governance. The Chamber of Commerce, Industry and Agriculture implements specific sector and market surveys at national level, but there are only very limited mechanisms in place to feed this information into the design of active labour market programmes, job placement and matching services.

Despite a clear need, Lebanon has no specific employment strategy or action plan. Passive labour market and social protection policies and institutions are poorly developed and the current national social security system provided by the National Social Security Fund (NSSF) covers approximately only half of the Lebanese population. The NSSF mostly provides end-of-service indemnity, sickness and maternity insurance and family and education allowances. It has 35 offices throughout the country and inspects enterprises and work sites to verify that companies contribute to social security.

## BOX 1. THE SYRIAN CRISIS

Since the beginning of the conflict in Syria in 2011, 1.2 million Syrians have been registered by the UNHCR in Lebanon (up to mid-2015, when borders were officially closed). A much higher number of Syrians is estimated to be present in the country (up to 1.8 million). This makes Lebanon the country with the highest density of refugees in the world.

An international donors' conference held in London in February 2016 raised a total of USD 10 billion in pledges for Syria and the neighbouring countries. Of this amount, the EU is offering USD 2.4 billion in 2016 and 2017. It was agreed that funds would need to be devoted to humanitarian assistance but also to longer-term measures, including employment creation and the integration of Syrians in neighbouring countries' labour markets.

The impact of the Syrian crisis has been strongly felt in Lebanon and there have been negative consequences for tourism, foreign investment and capital inflows (World Bank, 2013). Moreover, because of the sudden arrival of a significant number of Syrians, upward pressures on prices can be expected, especially on housing. The World Bank estimates that the Syrians will cost the public finances USD 1.1 billion (2.3% of annual GDP) between 2012 and 2014, although this figure includes second-round effects of the Syrian conflict more generally.

The Syrian refugees in Lebanon are generally young: approximately 65% of all registered Syrians are under the age of 25 and almost 20% are children below the age of 4 (European Commission, 2016). They tend to have a low level of education (45% of them are unskilled and 43% are semi-skilled (ILO survey, 2014)) and there is a high incidence of poverty among the refugees. This implies major needs in terms of education and healthcare provision. The education sector is just one of the sectors that is stretched to its limits. The Minister of Education has called for international support in providing resources to address the challenge of approximately 400 000 Syrian students entering the system.

Lebanon has not signed the 1951 UN Refugee Convention and its 1967 protocol establishing the rights of refugees to engage in wage-earning employment and self-employment. Registered Syrian refugees were allowed to work in the country until 2015, when national authorities suspended this right. Syrians are now requested to sign a pledge not to work, unless it is in one of three low-skilled sectors (agriculture, construction and 'environment', i.e. cleaning services). Given the absence of official refugee camps and a concrete need to earn a living, this has resulted in an enormous expansion of informal activities: 92% of economically active Syrians work in the informal economy (ILO survey, 2014). Other consequences are downward pressures on wages and poor labour conditions. Most informal Syrian workers are active in services, domestic work, agriculture, commerce and construction.

Economic activity rates seem to be low for Syrians (47%), with high peaks of unemployment (33%), especially among women: 19% of Syrian women are economically active and 68% are unemployed (ILO, 2014). ILO findings also show a high incidence of child labour (8% of those between the age of 10 and 14). The ILO survey indicates that the cost of school fees, the lack of proximity to schools and administrative issues (such as deadlines for registration) are among the most frequent reasons for the lack of enrolment.

The influx of Syrian refugees has put more pressure on some of the existing challenges in the Lebanese labour market such as unemployment, informality and decent work. The ETF 2006 MISMES project is conducting an analysis of support measures that exist for refugees from a skills and employment perspective (this is an extensive analysis and includes potential migrants, returnees and foreign workers in Lebanon). The final report should be available by the end of 2016 but the initial findings indicate that very few measures exist in this regard. The country does not have a policy or strategy for migration and displacement and there is a scarcity of national measures to support outbound migrants, labour migrants and refugees. Even less exists in terms of skills development, labour market integration or career guidance. Given the low level of skills and educational attainment of Syrian refugees, competition between Syrian and Lebanese workers is more intense in the low-skill, low-pay end of the spectrum, where Syrian workers were found to accept lower salaries and worse conditions at work (ILO, 2014), thus undercutting Lebanese jobseekers.

The development of reliable and regular data on the profile of Syrians in the country would be fundamental to designing appropriate interventions and to financing policies that could positively affect the different groups. Skills development programmes for both Syrian and Lebanese people would need to be better structured, especially in sectors where there is good potential for development (for instance, agriculture and agro food, health care, waste recycling, construction and real estate) and export.

# ANNEXES

## Statistical annex

This annex reports annual data from 2011 and 2015 or the last available year.

| | Indicator | | 2011 | 2015 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Total population (000) | | 4 591.7 | 5 850.7 |
| 2 | Relative size of youth population (age group 15–24) (%) | | 29.5 | 28.7 |
| 3 | Youth dependency ratio (%) | | 34.7 | 35.4 |
| 4 | Old-age dependency ratio (%) | | 12.2 | 12.0 |
| 5 | Global Competitiveness Index | Rank | 89 | 101 |
| | | Score | 3.9 | 3.8 |
| 6 | GDP growth rate (%) | | 2.0 | 1.5 |
| 7 | GDP per capita (PPP) (current international $) | | 15 683.6 | 13 937.9 |
| 8 | GDP by sector (%) | Agriculture added value | 4.1 | 5.6 |
| | | Industry added value | 16.1 | 20.7 |
| | | Services added value | 79.7 | 73.8 |
| 9 | Poverty headcount ratio at $2 a day (PPP) (%) | | M.D. | M.D. |
| 10 | Gini index (%) | | M.D. | M.D. |
| 11 | Educational attainment of adult population (aged 25–64 or 15+) (%) | Low* | 64.3 (2009) | 66.5 (2012) |
| | | Medium | 17.3 (2009) | 15.3 (2012) |
| | | High | 18.2 (2009) | 17.9 (2012) |
| 12 | Gross enrolment rates in secondary education (%) | | 76.1 | 68.2 (2013) |
| 13 | Share of VET students in secondary education (%) | | 17.2 | 14.8 (2013) |
| 14 | Gross enrolment rates in upper secondary education (%) | | 68.8 | 57.9 (2013) |
| 15 | Share of VET students in upper secondary education (%) | | 31.6 | 27.3 (2013) |
| 16 | Low achievement in reading, mathematics and science – PISA (%) | Reading | N.A. | N.A. |
| | | Mathematics | N.A. | N.A. |
| | | Science | N.A. | N.A. |
| 17 | Participation in training/lifelong learning (age group 25–64) by sex (%) | Total | M.D. | M.D. |
| | | Male | M.D. | M.D. |
| | | Female | M.D. | M.D. |
| 18 | Early leavers from education and training (age group 18–24) by sex (%) | Total | M.D. | M.D. |
| | | Male | M.D. | M.D. |
| | | Female | M.D. | M.D. |
| 19 | Activity rates (aged 15+) by sex (%) | Total | 35.8 (2009) | 38.7 (2012) |
| | | Male | 53.9 (2009) | 55.4 (2012) |
| | | Female | 17.3 (2009) | 23.5 (2012) |

| | Indicator | | 2011 | 2015 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 20 | Employment rates (aged 15+) by sex (%) | Total | 44.6 (2009) | 44.9 (2012) |
| | | Male | 69.2 (2009) | 66.9 (2012) |
| | | Female | 20.4 (2009) | 25.3 (2012) |
| 21 | Unemployment rates (aged 15–64) by sex (%) | Total | 6.4 (2009) | 9.7 (2012) |
| | | Male | 5 (2009) | 7.7 (2012) |
| | | Female | 10.4 (2009) | 13.8 (2012) |
| 22 | Unemployment rates (aged 15+) by educational attainment (%) | Low** | 4.6 (2009) | 8.1 (2012) |
| | | Medium | 7.7 (2009) | 13.9 (2012) |
| | | High | 8.8 (2009) | 11.4 (2012) |
| 23 | Youth unemployment rates (aged 15–24) by sex (%) | Total | 16.8 (2009) | 18.7 (2012) |
| | | Male | 14.6 (2009) | 18 (2012) |
| | | Female | 22.3 (2009) | 20.4 (2012) |
| 24 | Proportion of long-term unemployed out of the total unemployed (aged 15+) (%) | | M.D. | M.D. |
| 25 | Long-term unemployment rate (aged 15+) (%) | | M.D. | M.D. |
| 26 | Incidence of self-employment (%) | | 36.9 (2009) | 28.9 (2012) |
| 27 | Share of the employed in the public sector (%) | | 12.3 (2009) | M.D. |
| 28 | Employment by sector (%) | Agriculture | 6.3 (2009) | 4.5 (2012) |
| | | Industry | 21.0 (2009) | 19.3 (2012) |
| | | Services | 72.7 (2009) | 76.3 (2012) |
| 29 | Employment in the informal sector (%) | | M.D. | M.D. |
| 30 | Proportion of people aged 15–24 not in employment, education or training (NEETs) by sex (%) | Total | 21.3 (2007) | M.D. |
| | | Male | 16.0 (2007) | M.D. |
| | | Female | 27.3 (2007) | M.D. |
| 31 | Public expenditure on education (as % of GDP) | | 1.65 | 2.56 (2013) |
| 32 | Public expenditure on education (as % of total public expenditure) | | 5.7 | 8.6 (2013) |
| 33 | Skill gaps (%) | | 55.5 (2009) | 15.3 (2013) |
| 34 | Contribution of SMEs to GDP (%) | | M.D. | M.D. |
| 35 | Share of SMEs in employment (%) | | M.D. | M.D. |

***Sources: Indicators 1, 2** – UNDP_WPP15; **3, 4, 6, 7, 8** – World Bank, World Development Indicators database; **5** – World Economic Forum; **11, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 28** – Eurostat; **12, 13, 14, 15, 31, 32** – UNESCO Institute for Statistics; **27** – National Statistical Office of Lebanon (CAS); **30** – ILOSTAT*

***Legend:** N.A. = not applicable; M.D. = missing data*

***Notes:** (*) Includes illiterate people. (**) ISCED 0-1.*

# Definition of indicators

| | Description | Definition |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Total population (000) | The total population is estimated as the number of persons having their usual residence in a country on 1 January of the respective year. When information on the usually resident population is not available, legal or registered residents can be considered. |
| 2 | Relative size of youth population (age group 15–24) (%) | The ratio of the youth population (aged 15–24) to the working-age population (usually aged 15–64 or 15–74). |
| 3 | Youth dependency ratio (%) | The ratio of younger dependents (people younger than 15) to the working-age population (those in the 15–64 age group). |
| 4 | Old-age dependency ratio (%) | The ratio of older dependents (people older than 64) to the working-age population (those in the 15–64 age group). |
| 5 | Global Competitiveness Index | The Global Competitiveness Index assesses the competitiveness landscape, providing insight into the drivers of countries' productivity and prosperity. It is expressed as a score on a 1 to 7 scale, with 7 being the most desirable outcome. |
| 6 | GDP growth rate (%) | The annual percentage growth rate of GDP at market prices based on constant local currency. |
| 7 | GDP per capita (PPP) (current international $) | The market value of all final goods and services produced within a country in a given period of time (GDP), divided by the total population and converted into international dollars using purchasing power parity (PPP) rates. |
| 8 | GDP by sector (%) | The share of value added from agriculture, industry and services. |
| 9 | Poverty headcount ratio at $2 a day (PPP) (%) | The percentage of the population living on less than $2.00 a day at 2005 international prices. |
| 10 | Gini index (%) | A Gini index measures the extent to which the distribution of income (or, in some cases, consumption expenditure) among individuals or households within an economy deviates from a perfectly equal distribution. A Gini index of 0 represents perfect equality, while an index of 100 implies perfect inequality. |
| 11 | Educational attainment of adult population (aged 25–64 or 15+) (%) | Educational attainment refers to the highest educational level achieved by individuals expressed as a percentage of all persons in that age group. |
| 12 | Gross enrolment rates in secondary education (%) | The number of students enrolled in a given level of education, regardless of age, expressed as a percentage of the official school-age population corresponding to the same level of education. |
| 13 | Share of VET students in secondary education (%) | The proportion of VET students in secondary education out of the total number of pupils and students in secondary education (general + VET). |
| 14 | Gross enrolment rates in upper secondary education (%) | The number of students enrolled in a given level of education, regardless of age, expressed as a percentage of the official school-age population corresponding to the same level of education. |
| 15 | Share of VET students in upper secondary education (%) | The proportion of VET students in upper secondary education out of the total number of pupils and students in upper secondary education (general education + VET). |
| 16 | Low achievement in reading, mathematics and science – PISA (%) | The share of 15-year-olds failing to reach level 2 in reading, mathematics and science. |
| 17 | Participation in training/lifelong learning (age group 25–64) by sex (%) | The share of persons aged 25–64 who stated that they had received education or training in the four weeks preceding the (LFS) survey. |

| | Description | Definition |
|---|---|---|
| 18 | Early leavers from education and training (age group 18–24) by sex (%) | The percentage of the population aged 18–24 with at most lower secondary education who were not in further education or training during the four weeks preceding the (LFS) survey. Lower secondary education refers to ISCED 1997 levels 0–3C short for data up to 2013 and to ISCED 2011 levels 0–2 for data from 2014 onwards. |
| 19 | Activity rates (aged 15+) by sex (%) | Activity rates represent the labour force as a percentage of the working-age population. |
| 20 | Employment rates (aged 15+) by sex (%) | Employment rates represent persons in employment as a percentage of the working-age population. |
| 21 | Unemployment rates (aged 15+) by sex (%) | Unemployment rates represent unemployed persons as a percentage of the labour force. |
| 22 | Unemployment rates (aged 15+) by educational attainment (%) | Educational levels refer to the highest educational level successfully completed. Three levels are considered: low (ISCED levels 0–2); medium (ISCED levels 3–4); and high (ISCED 1997 levels 5–6 and ISCED 2011 levels 5–8). |
| 23 | Youth unemployment rates (aged 15–24) by sex (%) | Youth unemployment rates represent young unemployed persons (aged 15–24) as a percentage of the labour force (15–24). |
| 24 | Proportion of long-term unemployed out of the total unemployed (aged 15+) (%) | The number of unemployed persons aged 15+ who are long-term unemployed (12 months or more) as a percentage of unemployed persons aged 15+. |
| 25 | Long-term unemployment rate (aged 15+) (%) | The number of unemployed persons aged 15+ who are long-term unemployed (12 months or more) as a percentage of the labour force aged 15+. |
| 26 | Incidence of self-employment (%) | The share of self-employed as a proportion of the total employed. Self-employment includes employers, own-account workers, members of producers' cooperatives and contributing family workers. |
| 27 | Share of the employed in the public sector (%) | The share of those employed in the public sector as a proportion of the total employed. |
| 28 | Employment by sector (%) | The share of those employed in agriculture, industry and services. |
| 29 | Employment in the informal sector | The share of persons employed in the informal sector in total non-agricultural employment. |
| 30 | Proportion of people aged 15–24 not in employment, education or training (NEETs) (%) | The percentage of the population of a given age group who are not employed and not involved in further education or training. |
| 31 | Public expenditure on education (as % of GDP) | Public expenditure on education expressed as a percentage of GDP. Generally, the public sector funds education either by directly bearing the current and capital expenses of educational institutions, or by supporting students and their families with scholarships and public loans, as well as by transferring public subsidies for educational activities to private firms or non-profit organisations. Both types of transactions together are reported as total public expenditure on education. |
| 32 | Public expenditure on education (as % of total public expenditure) | Public expenditure on education expressed as a percentage of total public expenditure. Generally, the public sector funds education either by directly bearing the current and capital expenses of educational institutions, or by supporting students and their families with scholarships and public loans as well as by transferring public subsidies for educational activities to private firms or non-profit organisations. Both types of transactions together are reported as total public expenditure on education. |
| 33 | Skill gaps (%) | The percentage of firms identifying an inadequately educated workforce as a major constraint. |
| 34 | Contribution of SMEs to GDP (%) | The share of value added from small and medium-sized businesses. |
| 35 | Share of SMEs in employment (%) | The share of persons employed in small and medium-sized businesses. |

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