Rapid Education Diagnostic Assessment Lebanon (RED / EDA)

Summary report

30 June 2021
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Preliminary remarks

Background, objectives and target audience

At the request of the European Commission, through the Directorate-General for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations (EU DG NEAR) and the European Union Delegation (EUD) to Lebanon, the European Training Foundation (ETF) conducted a rapid diagnosis of the education sector in Lebanon. The funding for the Reaching All Children with Education (RACE) programme, earmarked for Syrian refugees, comes to an end, and there is limited resource planning for the education sector. Therefore, the priority objective for this rapid diagnosis is to inform the next programming phase of the EU financial assistance to ensure targeted and efficient investments in the education sector in Lebanon.

This rapid education diagnostic assessment (the diagnosis) has been conducted in close coordination with the Lebanese Ministry of Education and Higher Education (MEHE). The MEHE is currently prioritizing its reform measures (i.e. its next 5-year education plan and implementation plan of the Sustainable Development Goal 4 on Education), and could also use the results of this diagnosis to confirm or adjust its reform measures.

This report combines evidence-based analytical findings and short-term to long-term policy recommendations, as well as benchmarking elements that enable the comparison of Lebanon with other countries in the region. Three ‘best-fit’ dimensions have been identified to analyse the Lebanese system: Inequalities, Financing, and Resilience.

Methodology

This diagnosis relies on the work of a team of experts, comprised of ETF specialists and international and national consultants. MEHE established a national Technical Team, under the leadership of the DG General Education, to contribute to the analysis, and other national stakeholders were consulted on an ad hoc basis through bilateral interviews or collective ‘targeted consultation meetings’ (TCMs). Rania Saikaly acted as the national focal point. A Steering Committee of the initiative’s four partners ensured strategic monitoring throughout the task.

The team conducted the diagnosis between September 2020 and May 2021. After a desk review phase (September to December 2020), which led to an issues paper, an in-depth analytical and field-based phase followed from January to May 2021. The team reviewed about 120 documents,

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1 The project team was multi-disciplinary; in ETF, it was comprised of Marie Dorléans (team leader) and Carmo Gomes, senior human capital development specialists, Stylianos Karagiannis and Stefano Lasagni, human capital development statisticians, Simona Rinaldi, country liaison officer for Lebanon, Sabina Asselle and Simone Faltz, project officers, Ayoub el Bassite and Anna Galvagno, stagiaires. They were supported by Jerome Dendura and Martina Nicoi, international consultants respectively on public finance management and resilience/inclusion, as well as by Abdel Fattah Khoder, key national expert, Layal Nassar, on-line consultation facilitator and Sara Anani, interpreter. Hugues Moussy, ETF head of unit, supervised this project.

2 Fanny Seree, DG NEAR, Maxence Daublain, EU Delegation to Lebanon, DGE Fadi Yarak, MEHE & ETF.
interviewed 25 persons, and involved 80 people in collective TCMs. This process enabled the collection of quantitative and qualitative evidence for the diagnosis presented below.

**Disclaimer**

The expected added value of this diagnosis is to provide an accurate analysis of the consequences of the various recent crises affecting the education system, i.e. the growing demand from Syrian refugees and Lebanese communities for public education due to the economic downturn, or to Covid-19 consequences on the supply of quality education and training to rapidly meet external conditions, as well as addressing some of the profound and structural imbalances with which the education sector in Lebanon is confronted.

Exogenous constraints to the exercise cannot ensure indisputable results: in particular, the time frame set for completing the diagnosis, Covid-19 pandemic conditions impeding any real field mission, and the difficult access to data. The reader is strongly encouraged to consider this report as i) a tool to raise an alarm bell on the most burning issues of the sector (hence the acronym “RED”); ii) a contribution to setting up a national roadmap for improved education policy. It is essential to consider this diagnosis as a starting point rather than an end point: it should be used as a support for organising a technical dialogue around the needs and opportunities of the Lebanese education system, helping to build consensus around policy options and external support priorities.

The contents of this paper are the sole responsibility of the ETF and do not necessarily reflect the views of the EU institutions.
A. Context

A1. General context
Over the last three years, Lebanon has experienced acute crises that add to its long-lasting political instability, refugee crisis, and economic depression, depriving the country of harmonious and stable development for more than a decade. One quarter of its 6 million inhabitants are Syrian refugees, 85% of which live below the poverty line. With the devaluation of the Lebanese pound and price inflation, the population has now lost more than 90% of their purchasing power between 2019 and 2021, and things are continuing to escalate. With a depleted economy, few opportunities, and increasing inequalities, youth may emigrate, thus further depriving the economy from the few who can acquire and apply their vocational, professional, and higher education skills. This youth brain drain calls for revisiting the education model. At the same time, the Covid-19 pandemic has led to the closure of schools for more than 15 months, and teachers were expected to assist blended and remote (home) learning the rest of the time, leaving behind the most vulnerable students who have no connectivity, nor devices, at home. It is estimated that actual school attendance represented at best 25% of total expected time during the pandemic.3

A2. Specificities of the Lebanese education system

1.1 A high share of private education provision
The school landscape is composed of a mosaic-like pattern of education providers in Lebanon: public schools, not-for-profit, subsidized or not, private schools owned by various religious groups, modern non-sectarian schools, profit schools, and elite schools. They are all different according to their educational goals, ideological orientations, and quality of their educational infrastructure and outputs.

Within this pattern, the high share of the private sector is a dominant and defining feature of the system. In 2019/20, according to CERD data, more than 50% of the pupils from kindergarten to secondary schools were enrolled in the private sector (private and private free schools, see figure 1.1). Private education cannot be placed under one umbrella, because it is a diversified education sector that mirrors the diversity of the Lebanese sectarian and socio-economic structure. In 2019, private school enrolments reached 74.7% in pre-school, 71.8% in primary, and 58.1% in secondary.4 The private and public sectors have a communicating vessels relationship and, for this reason, education issues in Lebanon should be approached in a comprehensive manner that is not limited to the public or private sector separately. However, there is currently no education sector strategy, nor governance/management structure, that meet this comprehensive public-private education sector need.

3 Source: interview with Ms Khoury, DOPS and Mr Yarak, DGE.
1.2 A public education provision with a double shift, rented premises, and an important contractual teaching force

Many public schools operate in premises rented to private owners. Beyond the burden for the State budget, this also raises an issue of efficiency of public spending when these schools are under-utilised. Moreover, one specificity of the Lebanese education system is the high reliance on contractual teachers.

In public schools, where most of the young displaced Syrian students are enrolled, a second shift in the afternoon has been created to accommodate them (see figure 1.1 and 1.20). They go to the same schools as Lebanese students, benefit from the same equipment and the same teachers (increasingly a majority of contractual teachers, see figures 2.20 and 2.21). But there are many challenges with the second shift, mostly for children of refugees, such as language, shortage of student and family socio-psychological support, special learning needs, and deprivileged socio-economic living conditions, which all have been aggravated by the effects of the pandemic and the absence of face-to-face teaching during the last one and a half years.

A.3 Remarkable achievements of the Lebanese education system

Although the Lebanese education system is currently under high pressure, it is key to recall its positive features, which could become assets to build upon in the near future. They include:

- **Resilience and resistance**: Despite 40 years of successive crises, the Lebanese education system keeps running, thus demonstrating a high level of resilience.

- **Absorption capacity and adaptation**: Over the last ten years, the public education system has been able to enrol a huge influx of Syrian students. Although essentially funded externally, and issues of quality were of concern, it demonstrates that the education system can restructure itself to welcome many more students at short notice.

- **Collective willingness**: Education communities across Lebanon are ready and eager to address the sector’s current systemic problems, through roundtable discussions, bringing diverse actors together to clearly identify and define the difficulties, present transparent data, and arrive step-by-step at effective solutions. The TCMs revealed the high level of support, at all levels, from schools (parents, students, teachers, etc.) to the national level, but with the expressed proviso that the government ensures follow-up to their commitment. They are hopeful and confident that solutions can be found and successfully implemented.

- **Systemic reform measures**: Some recent measures are promising in view of improving the conditions for successful systemic reforms. For example, the on-going consolidation of databases and information management systems could become a cornerstone for improved monitoring and evaluation of the system and policies.
B. Key findings

The team’s thorough analysis of the Lebanese education provision has led to the identification of three major and over-arching issues that would call for a systemic response:5

- Persistence, and likely aggravation over the recent period, of the inequalities that exist throughout the education system.
- Issues related to the financing of the sector.
- Resilience impetus that is hampered by governance-related bottlenecks.

B1. Inequalities

One of the main challenges of Lebanese society is its high level of inequalities. In 2018, the Gini coefficient6 in Lebanon was 41.77 while 18% of households earned below LBP 650,000 per month (the official minimum monthly wage in Lebanon was LBP 675,000 or USD $445). About 1% of the population retains 40% of its income.8 This is also reflected in the education system where imbalances have been assessed along three dimensions: school provision in terms of access and opportunities; educational outcomes; and youth transition to and within the labour market (i.e. the adequacy of labour market needs).

1.1 Access and opportunities

Inequities in access and opportunities within the Lebanese education system are summarised into five issues.

**Issue 1: School attainment:** School attainment is characterised by late enrolment in terms of age, high levels of grade repetition, and drop-out rates (see figure 1.5). The analysis at regional level reveals a negative relationship between enrolment rates and low income (see figures 1.33 and 1.34). Students from low-income regions do not continue, or must repeat, their studies due to socio-economic reasons. The lack of household support, and the need to support the family income, are reported as the main reasons for students leaving the education system.

**Issue 2: Non-Lebanese students:** By observing the student distribution by nationality and type of school – pre-school to secondary9 – large disparities can be highlighted between Lebanese and non-Lebanese students, in terms of the institutions they attend, as well as their net enrolment rates. Specifically, non-Lebanese students attend public schools or United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) schools.

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5 Data supporting the analysis is available in the appendix.
6 The Gini coefficient is a statistical measure of economic inequality in a population. It measures the dispersion of income or distribution of wealth within a population. A coefficient of zero indicates a perfectly equal distribution. A coefficient of one represents a perfect inequality when one person in a population would receive all the income, while other people earn nothing. In practice, the data shows that the coefficient generally ranges from 24% to 63%.
8 Source: Rethinking the Lebanese economic miracle: The extreme concentration of income and wealth in Lebanon 2005-2014; Lydia Assouad; World Working Paper (Series N° 2017/13), World Inequality Lab.
9 (%, 2019/20), CERD data.
Issue 3: Share of enrolment in private schools: In general education, the share of enrolment in private schools is as high as 64% while in the technical vocational education and training sector (TVET) it remains above 50\%\textsuperscript{10} with strong regional disparities. Private institutions are dominating in urban regions while public and free private schools are mainly found in rural regions, situated in the North, Bekaa, and South of the country.

Issue 4: Share of enrolment in public schools: With the recent crises, an exodus of students from private education to public education, from kindergarten to secondary school, is challenging the ability of the public system to absorb more students in addition to Syrian refugee students. The over-use of public schools (for the morning/first shift\textsuperscript{11}) is most prominent in poorer rural regions (see figure 2.23 and 2.24). For Syrian students in the last years of school, there is a small decrease in the number of enrolled students in the afternoon/second shift,\textsuperscript{12} a substantial decrease in morning shift, and a small positive trend for the private schools (see figure 1.18). Overall, in the last years, Syrian student enrolments decreased in both shifts (see figure 1.21). This decrease could be at least partially explained by the number of school-aged Syrians living in Lebanon, which is relatively stable in the last years but showed a decrease of 12 thousand units in the age group 5-11 during the period 2017-2019 (see figure 1.17). However, without having more disaggregated and detailed data it is difficult to demonstrate if the Syrian students decreased because they dropped out or because they simply left the country.

Issue 5: Regional and systemic imbalances in the public sector: Contractual teachers are predominantly working in the rural and/or poorest regions of the country. For example, the North region is the region with more public teachers in the country: in 2020/21 there were 12 thousand out of a total of nearly 36 thousand public teachers in the whole country. At the same time, it is the only region that has more than 50\% of their teachers that are Contractual and with less than the 40\% of the total is Civil Servants (MEHE data, see figure 2.27). The targeted consultation meetings informed that public teachers, especially in poor agricultural regions, have poor resources (building conditions, IT equipment, and internet connection) and intervene in schools with high dropout and repetition rates due to poor local socio-economic conditions. Similar regional inequities are found in digital and IT literacy, when considering the school type (public or private) that the student attends.

1.2 Educational outcomes

There are discouraging trends in the data for educational outcomes:

- In 2019, Lebanese students received on average 8.7 years of schooling, in contrast to other MENA countries which present many more years of schooling.
- The most educated students are found in the urban centres of the country, leaving students in peripheral regions lagging behind in educational performance (see figure 1.16).

\textsuperscript{10}ETF 2020.  
\textsuperscript{11}Data for the second shift is not available.  
\textsuperscript{12}Data for 2020/2021 is not available.
1. Lebanese students scored lower than students in OECD and MENA countries.\textsuperscript{13}

A combination of socio-economic factors, such as equity, gender, and school profile (see figure 1.16), determines the performance of Lebanese students. Broadly speaking, the Lebanese education system struggles to provide the necessary resources and provisions to disadvantaged students to generate a more equitable distribution of educational outcomes.

1.3 Youth transition to and within the labour market

Lebanese youth are facing obstacles when entering the labour market, as evidenced by the team’s analysis. Notably, the unemployment rate is higher for the 20-24 age group than the 15-19 age group, implying that Lebanese youth entering the labour market with more qualifications have more difficulties in finding a job.\textsuperscript{14} This is also confirmed by the unemployment rates of university graduates, which are much higher than the unemployment rates of secondary and intermediary educated youth (35.7%, 25.2% and 21.2% respectively).\textsuperscript{15} Also, almost half of the unemployed youth had been looking for work for more than a year, resulting in feelings of discouragement in relation to job seeking.

The current youth unemployment trend seems to validate the fact that entering the labour market with more qualifications is no longer a guarantee of finding an adequate job. This trend is marked, once again, by large regional disparities: employment opportunities are concentrated in the more urban and wealthier districts (Jbeil, Kesrwan, and Metn) while youth mainly in the peripheries have much fewer opportunities.\textsuperscript{16}

The TVET sector is defined by an uneven distribution of students, teachers and schools combined with the need for updated curricula. They are too disconnected from the demand side of the labour market, and the sector does not help to bridge the supply of vocational skills with the demand gaps in the country’s labour needs and priorities.

The over-specialised service-oriented economy of Lebanon, in conjunction with the lack of skills anticipation and matching mechanisms, does not generate enough jobs to accommodate the demand side of the labour market. A macro-economic aspect needs to be considered.

B2. Financing

2.1 Budget allocation on education

Since the 2000s, the education sector in Lebanon has been facing a major shortfall of domestic financing, although figures differ greatly according to the source. According to the MOF, in 2020 the share of the State budget allocated to education represents over 14% (or over 10% without debt) of the total budget. However, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimates

\textsuperscript{13} PISA analysis of the learners’ knowledge, skills and competencies; OECD’s PISA 2018 survey.
\textsuperscript{14} See graph 1.23 and 1.24 for the youth unemployment rate and NEET distribution.
\textsuperscript{15} LFHLCS, 2018-19, p. 69.
\textsuperscript{16} 22% in the 2018 ‘not in employment, education or training’ (NEET) data; Source: ETF database.
the education expenditure for 2019 at only 6.9% of the total government expenditure (see figure 2.1) or 2.15% of the GDP in 2019 (see figure 2.2) for education.

Additionally, public resources are used to finance private education, whether directly through subsidies to not-for-profit private schools, or via the stipends to civil servants for enrolling their children in private education. This deepens the differences between public schools and private schools, and thus between the poorer segment of society and the better off.

The share of public expenditure allocated to public schools is limited, at all sub-sector levels. As higher education, and to some extent TVET, are mostly accessible to students from private schools (partially subsidised but largely privately funded), public expenditure does not reduce inequalities through public education. The continuous degradation of public education and subsidised free education is an obstacle to merit, excellence, and employability for students.

2.2 Fragmentation of the financing system

The financing of education in Lebanon is highly fragmented in all segments of the sector: across the National Budget, private expenditure, and external donor funding. This multiplicity of sources induces a loss of efficiency in the allocation of funds, and a loss of transparency compounded by the non-availability of data.

The National Budget finances public schools, free private schools through subsidies, and private schools: all benefiting from the public monies. However, only public schools are fully integrated into the budgetary processes and into the education supervision and control mechanisms. The external financing is not integrated into the budgetary process as only some elements are found: it is only recorded within the MEHE accounting when known, creating likely distortions and reducing the capacity of MEHE to plan and allocate resources according to needs.

The consequences of this lack of transparency become even more evident when observing the emergency response to the Syrian crisis. Since 2013, RACE has mutated into a parallel grant system without the standard public finance control and transparency mechanisms. A virtual and unverifiable dichotomy between MEHE’s budget and RACE’s budget has weakened the public finance management of the sector, while reducing the opportunities for efficiency gains. With the lack of fully disclosed information and data on RACE, it is difficult to plan efficiently, allocate resources according to needs, and identify policy priorities.

2.3 Financing tools related to the education sector

Multi-annual planning and budgeting processes are not reliable guides to execution. The budget is systematically under-spent and budgeting is not supported by robust financing tools, leading to arrears and inefficiencies. The financial management system, although very centralised, which could have been an opportunity for better control, presents a disconnect between policy planning, implementation plans, and budgeting for education.
The MEHE budget does not seem solidly anchored to policies or plans, and no cost estimation of activities is made to support it. It also does not include external financing, i.e. development partners’ support. Given the size of external financing, either as loans or as grants, it is a major limitation to having a comprehensive view of the sector.

Similarly, no cash plan is prepared to reflect procurement, salaries and compensations, in spite of the provision in regulations. Consequently, the schools’ budget allocations are not paid on time (most notably, the contractual teachers’ salaries), which creates large problems for teachers’ motivation and even survival.

The capital budget is not integrated under MEHE’s management. The Council for development and reconstruction (CDR), headed by the Prime Minister’s Office, manages the budget. An IMF Public Investment Management Assessment was performed in 2018 but is not publicly available. Given that USD $1,340 million was allocated to the education sector (of which USD $288 million is ongoing and USD $578 million is externally funded), the lack of control and clarity on management quality and outputs are significantly reducing the scope to plan schools and their maintenance according to needs.

There is also a mismatch between data and policy planning. The linkages between sector data and students’ needs are uneven (e.g. the student enrolment rate in SIMS is used formally for subsidies in schools and parents’ funds), and most importantly there are no “technical” linkages between data and budget allocation. This approach implies that the Lebanon public education cannot respond to needs in a systematised manner. Indeed, currently the SIMS, a business Intelligence tool that can generate some of the performance indicators, is not directly linked to a set of policies and plans.

These and other misfunctions generate a system where efficiency is impaired by the fragmentation of the financing and its management, and by the lack of tools to ensure improvements, while effectiveness cannot be verified due to the lack of data and indicators to measure achievements.

In essence, the financial management of the sector, already as weak as the Public finance management of Lebanon, cannot address economy, efficiency, and effectiveness. The basics for establishing a robust annual planning and budgeting process still have to be addressed.

2.4 Overall picture of cost and expenses

The cost of education is unclear. According to the data shared by MEHE, it is not possible to arrive at more than an average cost (similar to the World Bank public expenditure review). Even the WB review is questionable given the variance between budget and execution. Against this analysis, it is not clear how the standard costs for RACE were determined using the last term of 2013/14 as a reference, at USD $363 for the morning shift (“marginal” cost) and USD $600 for the
second shift (partial recovery). Further, the recent draft of the Education Sector Plan 2021-2025 (covering General Education only) presents the cost per student from LBP 550 to 22 million approximately, which is (before devaluation) an extreme variation from USD $366 to $14,000 per student. The cost per student calculation has three main variables: cost of teaching, cost of schools and cost of rent. The calculation is not sufficiently detailed by school and by student, nor does it take geographical and spatial approaches into account.

The standardisation of costs, without a deeper analysis of needs, leads to deepen inequalities. As a result, if we trust the rate for over-occupation of schools, most under-equipped and under-staffed public schools are located in the already poorer regions of North, Bekaa, South, and Nebatiyeh (see graph 2.23). No accounts are presented for the funds received per asset. For example, a morning shift is funded by both MEHE’s budget and RACE’s resources, and a second shift is funded by RACE’s resources: it is the same school but, in most cases, its administration and teachers are funded from two sources.

2.5 Teachers’ management

Teachers’ management is a critical problem, running a dual system of contractual and permanent teachers without the tools for ensuring equity, career management, and sound allocation of resources. The wage bill execution shows significant variations between budget and outturns, in minus for both permanent and contractual teachers (down by 25%), although some years contractual teachers’ execution is higher by up to 30%. This raises concerns about the planning capacity. The decision, taken 10 years ago, to shift to contract teaching has impacted all aspects of education (quality, efficiency, equity, and staff motivation). Therefore, this is a priority area for government’s improvement efforts.

Contractual teachers are more numerous in poorer areas (mainly peripheral/rural ones, see figure 2.27) and their proportion increased with the Syrian crisis and RACE second shift schools. While the number of contractual teachers increased and the number of teaching hours is higher than for civil servants (see figure 2.25), their wage bill was only 17.6% of permanent teachers’ salaries (not including other compensations) in 2020 (see figure 2.17). Most contractual teachers are qualified with a university degree, but are not receiving the necessary training for improving their teaching. Therefore, students in public schools, especially in poorer areas, are more likely to be taught by under-qualified teachers.

A joint database of CERD, MEHE and RACE data is unavailable to analyse the distribution of teachers by provinces, districts, or schools, and according to shifts. This is a serious limitation for financial control and inspections on quality of teaching, as well as career management.

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17 The MEHE recalled that RACE is a response plan: the cost estimates were made to “operate” as an emergency response, and so the costs of RACE are never covered fully; “50% at best. If the whole RACE strategy was fully funded, it would enable full coordination with MEHE.”


19 The document does not specify if it is based on budget or on actual outturns.
2.6 Public investment management at school level

School maintenance and refurbishments are under-managed, leading to significant inefficiencies, wasteful expenditures, and lower-quality school facilities. The Council for development and reconstruction (CDR) reported that one third of the schools are rented, costing a total of USD $20 million to the government (35% including residential properties which are ill-prepared for the safety of students and teachers). Under-occupied and over-occupied schools also lead to inefficiencies of budget allocations and ineffective learning conditions. Figure 5 shows the significance of the problem, amounting to 44% of primary schools and 34% of secondary schools.

It is estimated that MEHE spends USD $20 million on rent per year (Education Sector Plan 2021-2025). According to the TCMs, at least 35% of the buildings rented “are meant to be residential not schools. They have small rooms which lack proper lighting, painting, ventilation systems … These buildings do not contain any science lab, informatics lab, soccer field, library…” Interviewees also indicate that “the school building owner can impede their maintenance.” A similar finding, reported by a formal categorisation of school building status, undertaken by MEHE engineers, has shed light on the bad infrastructure of 30% of public schools (source: MEHE).

The financing of education has become, along with health, ‘the last carriage on the train.’ Defence and security forces takes the greatest share after debt servicing and energy subsidies. Lebanon cannot confront the current crises without addressing the overall allocations.

B3. Resilience and governance

The resilience of an education system can be defined as the ability of its actors to recover from shocks and vulnerabilities. **Shocks are not solely catastrophic disasters, but also one-off or persistent stressors:** they may appear minor initially, but over time, they can deplete the effectiveness of the education system – from students dropping out of school, lack of teaching quality, regional disparities, incomplete data and information about school operations, challenging policy implementation, to learning under-achievements.

A resilient education system requires **different levels of responses and capacities, from the macro to the micro level**, and a wide range of actors committed to making the change happen and to support the change process:

- **A transformative capacity at central level**, in terms of resilient-informed policies and guidelines, responsive centralized management, pre-service and in-service training of all categories of staff, and appropriate financing and use of funds.
- **An adaptive capacity at regional level**, in terms of effective school management and supervision, maintenance of school infrastructure, implementation of strategies and action plans, efficient communication, and clear regulations.

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20 410 rented schools over 1237 schools. Source: GIS.
21 Source: MEHE budget
An absorptive capacity at school level, in terms of management of staff and study programs, maintenance of infrastructures and equipment, shock responses and flexible emergency initiatives, school-community close collaboration and participation of different actors (parents, employers, NGOs, etc.).

There are four critical dimensions for a resilient Lebanese education system:

- A useful comprehensive EMIS.
- An effective funding mechanism.
- A planned and ready education workforce.
- Good governance.

Well-integrated and locally grounded education systems may be more rapidly responsive and resilient to internal shocks.

3.1 Institutional and human capacity

As donors and agencies are developing country-specific plans (including education resilience plans), there is not only a need for them to align with the Lebanese government, but the latter should take a clear and strong lead in planning and implementing the necessary capacity building actions for the education sector reform. Strengthening human capacity to support a resilient education system includes cross-sectoral education teams and departments with effective leadership and active participation of its personnel who have a high knowledge of their technical responsibilities as well as risk mitigation strategies and tools.

As evidence from the TCMs, there is a serious shortage of school support services that could deliver socio-psychological assistance, career guidance services, and specific pedagogic support to students with special needs and disabilities. But there is also lack of effective public finance management knowledge and general administration skills both for school directors and regional education administrators, as well as innovative and modern pedagogical methods and techniques, in particular for teachers using distance learning modalities.

3.2 Data systems use for policy making

The effective and efficient usage of data is hampered by the disconnection of accountability and workflow between data producers and potential users (CERD/TVET/DGGE/RACE second shift), and the lack of a unified monitoring and evaluation framework to ensure sound policy making based upon reliable and transparent data and information. There are currently four education management information systems:

- SIMS – School Information and Management System.
- CASE (CERD platform)
- NSL – National Student Lists for the private education sector.
- “Compiler” platform for second shift students.
An effective EMIS needs to be able to provide quality data, information, and statistics for all elements of the education process that captures data on financial, infrastructure, administrative, teaching, and student demographics. Data should also be produced in such a way that it informs policies and avoids discretionary decisions. This is not yet the case in Lebanon, leading to increased vulnerabilities of the education sector management. Even though substantial progress has been witnessed in SIMS, e.g., by providing a unique ID to all students (private and public), enhancements are needed to include into SIMS relevant educational and financial modules, as well as to unify the existing databases and platforms.

For instance, regarding policies towards the teaching profession, the TCMs revealed:

- **Discoordination in decisions, planning, and execution** procedures at the different levels of the education system.
- **Infrequent opportunities for professional development** (pre-service and in-service), especially for contractual teachers.
- **Lack of transparent procedures** and criteria for recruitment and performance evaluation.

These examples can also be found in other areas of the education sector management.

### 3.3 Centralization vs. Decentralization

The governance model of the Lebanese education system is based upon a highly-centralised approach from the MEHE, which has the main decision-making power for leading the reform processes and taking legislative initiatives on matters related to education and training, as well as the main access point for donor interventions.

However, the TCMs noted that these centralised powers protract decision-making, which, in times of shocks, limits the regional-level and school-level administration to take the necessary timely actions to mitigate shocks. There is a need to improve the coordination between the Ministry of Education (central and regional departments) and the school Directors to support a well-functioning, responsive education sector. For example, school Directors reported that a formal request approval procedure that could be executed through digital communication channels currently takes several weeks due to the paper trail. These procedures should be revised to improve the pace and efficacy of communication and decision-making procedures, including the possibility of delegating responsibilities to regional/school administration.

### 3.4 Good governance, funding and partnerships

The Lebanese education system benefits from significant financial support from international donors, including EU financial assistance, World Bank loans, and bilateral donor supports. System actors reported some flaws in the governance model of such funds. These could be overcome by more transparent allocations and related financial management procedures as well as through better coordination mechanisms led by the public authorities themselves, with clear responsibilities.

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assigned, quality assurance and accountability mechanisms put in place, and accurate and participatory monitoring and reporting schemes.

Good governance also means the possibility of different actors at different levels and representing different interests participating in the decision-making process or on the monitoring and reporting exercises through formal consultation processes. There is lack of 'partnership spirit' in the governance of the Lebanese education system. This is reflected in the absence of formal social dialogue mechanisms, but also in regular consultation and dialogue with third parties and non-governmental actors. The preparation process of the 5-year education sector plan, to be followed by its implementation, could provide the opportunity for a more collaborative approach, provided it reaches out stakeholders beyond MEHE and includes them in a systematic/institutionalised manner.

3.5 Continuous Learning, Evidence, and Research (CLEAR)
Learning from past shocks provides important lessons on how to make the education system more resilient today. From the TCMs, it appeared evident that technical departments do not have the expertise and human capabilities needed to conduct Research and Development tasks and to follow-up on the implementation of plans. The Continuous Learning, Evidence, and Research (CLEAR) approach enables the system to distinguish the capacity to absorb a shock but continue to function as before; to adapt to a shock (largely functioning as before but with some change); or to transform completely from a shock.
C. Recommendations for next steps

This report is one of the many analyses produced on the state of the education system in Lebanon. While there is limited chance that the availability of such a diagnostic would per se trigger change and policy reforms, the identification of concise steps to bring these issues forward seems to be more promising. Therefore, based upon the findings shared in Section B, the ETF has arrived at two distinct sets of recommendations for the next steps:

- Recommendations regarding priorities for (EU or other) intervention: these recommendations could be implemented in a relatively short term, through the definition of new programmes following the end of RACE.
- Recommendations regarding priorities for national policy debate: these concern burning but complex issues, to which a solution would require more preparation time, defined to be mid-term to long-term. Consultations and discussion would need to be structured and start immediately.

C1. Priorities for intervention (short term)

As the EU, and maybe other donors, is exploring priorities for its next financial support, the team would recommend the following, which stems from the diagnosis in Section B: address both micro (school) and macro (policy) levels through a targeted intervention based on clear selection criteria. The next paragraphs provide more details.

1.1 At micro, school level

To combat inequalities, give priority support to the public provision of education, as well as, if funds allow, free private education.

With the Lebanese education system being more than 50% private, it could be argued that supporting the majority of students to access the education service would imply supporting both public and private provision of schools. However, analyses have also shown that the most vulnerable students usually attend either public education or free private education. This phenomenon has been accentuated due to the current economic crisis, through which many families, who could no longer afford private education, have transferred their children from private schools to public schools. The provision of second shift education, created to offer an education solution to Syrian children, has only been introduced in public schools. These students are at high risk of dropping out and form part of a vulnerable segment of the population in Lebanon, while the many difficulties deriving from the coexistence of first shift and second shift education needs to be addressed, especially at a moment where the support to the second shift will soon cease as RACE ends. For all these reasons, any intervention that aims to offset or mitigate inequalities needs to 

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23 As Section B has shown, vulnerability is a cumulative concept. The most vulnerable students from an economic point of view (low family income) are also those who will have fewer chances to access higher levels of education and be more at risk of dropping out of school (early school leavers) including in the middle of an education cycle.
target, as a priority, these students where they are – i.e. earmark funds for this type of schooling, in addition to addressing, at the macro level, policy issues that will concern them immediately, such as the quality of teachers.

Which schools within public education (or free private education) should be targeted?

Choose one or a set of smart indicators for identifying the priority schools.
The analysis, and in particular the many TCMs, have revealed that the distinction between urban and rural areas, used in many countries as a relevant demarcation line to assess disparities, is not so relevant in the Lebanese context. In fact, geographical areas of high poverty may be located in ‘urban’ districts, in suburbs of big cities, as well as in remote areas. On the other hand, areas of poor conditions for education provision, linked, in particular, to over-crowded schools compared to their theoretical absorption capacity, may lie anywhere in the country. Their existence is linked more to ineffective management of resources and an ‘irrational’ resource allocation mechanism, from the school-needs point of view, than to any geographical characteristic they would have in common.

Therefore, it is recommended to choose, in agreement with MEHE, one or more of the following (objective and reliable) indicators as selection criteria for identifying the public schools that would receive an earmarked support:

**DISTRICT LEVEL:**
- % NEET, district level

**SCHOOL LEVEL:**
- Occupation rate per school
- % of contractual teachers of the total of teachers per school
- Student/teacher ratio per school
- Drop-out rate per school or ALTERNATIVE TO DROP OUT: rate of graduated students out of students enrolled, per school
- % of foreign students (Syrian, Palestinian, etc.) enrolled per school

**SCHOOL INFRASTRUCTURE:**
- Computer per students per school
- Fast internet connection available in the school.

What to do in these selected schools? Define an integrated and needs-based intervention.

Within these priority schools, the purpose of the intervention would be to offer integrated support, endeavouring to address the various dimensions of weaknesses observed in the analysis that can be addressed at school level (e.g. the issue of curricula is on the contrary an area in need, but which can only be addressed at national/macro level).

- **School needs:** In terms of infrastructure and equipment, operational costs and expenses, open a discussion on the status of the premises (rented or not), the priorities for improvement, securing premises, and renewing equipment.

- **Teacher needs:** While the status issue requires decisions at national levels, schools can at least start by: i) mapping their teaching force, and compare it to the payroll and to the curricula requirements (are some teachers plethoric/some subjects missing profiles, etc.),
and ii) list the training, coaching, and mentoring needs especially on psychosocial skills, etc.). The role of technical assistance would be crucial to help alleviate the social pressures from school heads.

- **Students and family needs**: Support of the learning needs for students whose families are unable to provide it (especially young students in primary cycles). Orientation and career guidance services for students and families (including checking the current offer, the status/reactivating the DOPS counsellors), free transportation services, and school feeding services.

School support could be tailored to a collective elaboration of a school development plan, which would be not only a one-off exercise, but a concrete and structured way to experiment with new mechanisms of shared governance at the school level. These mechanisms, involving users (parents, students, etc.), partners of the school (local associations, NGOs, etc.) are urgently needed to ensure transparency and objectivity in all choices regarding education to counterbalance the sensitive, politicised functioning of the Lebanese society.

**1.2 At macro, policy level**

In parallel to a school-based targeted intervention, two macro-level interventions with a high leveraging potential, should also be included in the short-term roadmap for support: the teachers’ management framework, and the monitoring and evaluation framework.

**Macro-level intervention 1: Teachers’ management framework**: Establish a concerted process with the MOF to re-open the discussion with IMF. It should be documented as the argument for pleading to offset the ceiling/freezing of civil servants’ recruitments, which is closely linked to: i) expected retirement departures in the teaching force, and ii) mapping the current teaching force. This calls for a specific, in-depth analysis that may only be funded and implemented with external support, and at the express condition of a political commitment at the highest level of the Lebanese state. The discussion should also concern the following:

- Deployment rules, and in particular explore the possibility to decentralise/regionalise recruitments (with a view to ensure greater stability of personnel, and adequate staffing in less attractive areas).
- Career paths.
- Training support (pre-service and in-service).

**Macro-level intervention 2: Monitoring and evaluation (M&E) framework**: The 5-year education plan, currently under discussion, provides a golden opportunity to establish a robust M&E framework, which would need to combine the following dimensions:

- A collective/participatory governance setting, including a broad range of stakeholders, as a key element of transparency – pre-figuring renewed, shared forms of governance, and helping to overcome the over-centralisation of the system.
- A concise indicators matrix, against which to monitor progress of the policy/strategy linked to each priority pillar of the 5-year plan.
An effective monitoring and evaluation process defining how to ensure the M&E: types of meetings, support documents to be produced (e.g. technical reports, etc.), frequency of M&E tasks, expected results, and links with the policy cycle.

This M&E framework should have a two-fold ultimate objective:

- To reinforce donor coordination, while accompanying MEHE into a leading role.
- To pave the way for a sector-wide vision for the sector, and prepare the ground for the next planning phase.

C2. Priorities for national policy debate (mid-term to long-term)

Other issues need to be addressed within a more mid-term to long-term time frame, in terms of results, given that they require the adoption of a macro approach and engagement of a national policy debate to ensure ownership and sustainability of subsequent decisions. The topics for national policy debate would require an in-depth rethinking of the education system, including changes in policy processes (opening up consultation loops), often implying (sensitive) political decisions, and requiring resources (to be planned in the national budget, possibly complemented by external assistance). Among these topics, the team has identified:

- Decentralisation of the education system: how to move to a needs-based management of the system, including school development plans, autonomy of schools in the different sub-sectors, roles of municipalities and of REO, and cross-sectorial approaches (with social affairs, etc.).
- Policy and budget planning: from design to implementation to the M&E. This would lead to establishing a roadmap, linked with PFM reform, for more robust management of the system, and a secured budget.
- Revision and modernisation of the pedagogical framework: including curricula revision, a national learning assessment system, teacher training, and annex services to teaching and learning (psychosocial support etc.).
- Adequate regulations of the private education sector (GE, TVET and HE): taking into account its major role and the oversight responsibilities of the ministry.
D. Conclusion

This diagnosis aims to inform new EU financial assistance for the next programming period, and to open space for national debate in view of shared reform decisions. There is obviously a need for stability and recovery of the whole country to allow for a more efficient education system, but this is beyond the power of education authorities.

**Advice 1:** Improvements can be activated from within the existing context, ‘all things being equal,’ despite exogenous conditions.

**Advice 2:** Resilience thinking can replace emergency thinking. Instead of deploying NGO emergency thinking to education activities, it is essential to prepare for the future by working on systemic reforms and addressing systemic problems. In particular, address issues related to data management, institutional setting, and teachers’ management, while taking a ‘resilience’ approach, rather than an ‘emergency’ approach.

**Advice 3:** The combination and alignment of technical and political willingness are *de facto* a key success factor for future, sustainable improvements. The MEHE administration has demonstrated high interest and ownership in this diagnostic exercise. While efforts to organise consultations with a broad range of education stakeholders for a joint identification or priority reform areas are a prerequisite to go further, and can be supported by international partners, it will be crucial that this commitment, as well as readiness of the administration to open up sensitive discussions be backed by the political level, regardless of the contextual instability.
Appendix: Statistics and graphs

1- Access and Equity

1.1 Student distribution by type of school as % of total enrolment of each nationality (all educational level from pre-school to secondary): 2019/20

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>% Public 1st shift</th>
<th>% Private</th>
<th>% Private-free</th>
<th>% UNRWA</th>
<th>% Public 2nd shift (RACE)*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lebanese</td>
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<td>Syrian*</td>
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<td>Palestinian</td>
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<tr>
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<td>28.1%</td>
<td>45.8%</td>
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<td>3.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: CERD. Note: 2nd shift provides education only from pre-school to intermediary level.
*the detail of nationality on the 2nd shift is missing, thus all the 2nd shift students are assumed to be Syrians.

1.2 Student distribution by nationality and type of school (all educational level from pre-school to secondary): 2019/20

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Public 1st shift</th>
<th>Private</th>
<th>Private-free</th>
<th>UNRWA</th>
<th>Public 2nd shift (RACE)*</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<td>Total</td>
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<td>133,441</td>
<td>36,014</td>
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</table>

Source: CERD. Note: 2nd shift provides education only from pre-school to intermediary level.
*the detail of nationality on the 2nd shift is missing, thus all the 2nd shift students are assumed to be Syrians.

1.3 Syrian refugees in Lebanon by age groups (2015-2019)

1.4 Student distribution by nationality and type of school - pre-school to secondary (% 2019/20)

Source: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
Source: CERD data Notes : the 2nd shift provides education only from pre-school to intermediary level; Also, the detail of the nationality on the RACE 2nd shift is missing, thus all the
### Fail Grade Rates

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<th>2016-17</th>
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### Pass Grade Rates

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### Dropout Rates

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<th>2016-17</th>
</tr>
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### Survival Rates

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</table>

Source: CERD, ETF calculations

2nd shift students are assumed to be Syrians.
### 1.6 School attainment 2016-2020 (% population group)

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<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Pre-school</th>
<th>Kindergarten</th>
<th>Intermediate (Cycle 1 &amp; Cycle 2)</th>
<th>Secondary Education</th>
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<td>78.8</td>
<td>79.2</td>
<td>79.7</td>
<td>80.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019-20</td>
<td>73.3</td>
<td>73.3</td>
<td>73.3</td>
<td>73.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: calculations are based on the % of student attending within the respective theoretical group. Source: ETF estimations based on CERD data.

### 1.7 Map: Net enrolment rate (NER) in Secondary Education, 2018-19

Note: expressed as a percentage of the total population in that age group. A high NER denotes a high degree of coverage for the official school-age population. Source: LFHLCS, 2018-19

### 1.8 Dropout rates, 2016-17 to 2018-19

---Note: EL: elementary level; INT: intermediary level; SEC: secondary level

Source: ETF estimations based on CERD data

### 1.9 No of 15-year-old students that they had repeated a grade at least once (2018)

Source: OECD (2020) PISA 2018 Results (Volume V).

### 1.10 Students with link to the Internet at home, 2018 (%)

Source: OECD (2020) PISA 2018 V Results
1.11 VET students (2015-2019)

Source: UNESCO Institute for Statistics

1.11 Number of TVET students and schools (all levels): public vs. private

Source: DG-TVET/MEHE and CERD

1.12 N° of TVET students by level (all private and public schools)

Source: DG-TVET/MEHE and CERD
1.13 Mean years of schooling, MENA countries (2019)

Note: Average number of years of education received by people ages 25 and older.

1.14 Scores, PISA 2015 and 2018

1.15 Student performance in Lebanon, PISA 2015 & 2018

Sources: OECD (2020) PISA 2018 Results (Volume III).
### 1.16 Student performance and equity profile in Lebanon, PISA 2018

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Average</th>
<th>Lebanon</th>
<th>OECD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>Girls</td>
<td>366</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Boys</td>
<td>338</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School Type</td>
<td>Private</td>
<td>382</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Public</td>
<td>322</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location</td>
<td>City (&gt; 100,000)</td>
<td>374</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Town (3,000 - 100,000)</td>
<td>356</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rural (&lt; 3,000)</td>
<td>318</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESCS</td>
<td>Bottom 20% ESCS</td>
<td>307</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Top 20% ESCS</td>
<td>410</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: ESCS refers to the PISA index of Economic, Social and Cultural Status and is a composite measure of student’s socio-economic status. Source: OECD (2020) PISA 2018 Results (Volume III).
1.17 Syrian Refugees population age 5-11 and age 12-17: 2015 to 2019

Source: UNHCR

1.18 Enrolment of Syrian students by type of school from pre-school to secondary education. 2016/17 to 2020/21 (last year available only for public schools 1st shift)

Source: CERD, RACE, MEHE
1.19 Enrolment in public schools (1st shift only, all level from pre-school to secondary) by nationality. 2016/17 to 2020/21

Source: CERD, MEHE

1.20 Distribution of Syrian students by type of schools (pre-school to secondary): 2019/20

Source: CERD, RACE

1.21 Total and distribution of Syrian students by type of schools (pre-school to secondary): 2017/18 to 2019/20
1.22 Distribution of Syrian students in basic education: 2nd Shift vs. Other schools*

Source: ETF calculation based on CERD, RACE data

Note: Other schools include all type of schools that aren’t 2nd shift, secondary education excluded in both groups (no secondary in second shift)
1.23 Percentage distribution of unemployed men and women according to age groups, 2018-19 (15 years and above)

1.24 Youth not in education, employment or training rate (NEET), 2018-19 (% of 15-24 years old)

Source: LFH LCS, 2018-19
**Additional Figures, Tables and Maps**

1.25 Distribution of students in private schools, 2018-19 (% of total, age 3-24)

1.26 Distribution of students in public schools, 2018-19 (% of total, age 3-24)

Note: Refers to all education levels, up to tertiary education
Source: LFHLCS, 2018-19

1.27 Public school utilisation, secondary 2020-21

1.28 Students who have a computer for schoolwork at home, 2018 (%)

Note: figures include part of the intermediary level schools
Source: ETF calculations based on MEHE data
Source: OECD (2020) PISA 2018 V Results
1.29 Distribution of students per governorate (% of total students, 2018-19)

1.30 Distribution of general education schools among the education sectors, according to the date of the start of activity (2019-20)

Note: Numbers shown add to 100 for all education levels and for all regions
Source: CERD bulletin 2020

1.31 Average years of schooling of Lebanese (2018-19)

1.32 Average years of schooling of non-Lebanese (2018-19)

Source: LFHLCS, 2018-19
Net enrolment rates and income: a regional analysis

The following three figures present the regression (Ordinary Least Square) results between: i) the regional (26 Cazas) Net Enrolment Rates (NER) ratios in the three levels of education in Lebanon (elementary, intermediate, and secondary) and, ii) the percentage of households that have a monthly income of less than 650 thousand LBP. Results reveal a positive relationship with elementary and a negative one for intermediary and secondary education and low income.

1.33 Net rate of education and low income, 2018-19

1.34 Regional low-income distribution, 2018-19
**Multicriteria Analysis: Income, Schooling and NEET**

Using multiple correspondence analysis (MCA) techniques the indicators of: i) poverty (the percentage of households that have a monthly income of less than 650 thousand LBP; ii) Net enrolment rates in secondary education and iii) NEETs are analyzed. The indicators refer to the 26 districts of Lebanon and are clustered in three groups according to their levels (MIN, MED, MAX). The following graph presents the outcome of this analysis.

Source: ETF estimations based on LFHLCS 2018-2019 data.
2- Financing

2.1 Expenditure in education as % of total expenditure: MoF vs. IMF

Source: MoF, IMF

2.2 Expenditure in education as % of GDP: MoF vs. IMF

Source: MoF, IMF
2.3 Education spending as % of GDP and compared to debt and general public services spending

Source: IMF

2.4 Distribution of Total Government Expenditure

Source: IMF
### 2.5 Comparing Education spending as % of GDP

Source: IMF

### 2.6 Comparing Education spending as % of Total Government Expenditures

Source: IMF
2.7 MEHE budget by educational level

Source: MoF

2.8 MEHE budget by category

Source: MoF
2.9 MEHE budget: CAPEX-maintenance budget

[Graph showing CAPEX-maintenance budget as a percentage of the total budget from 2010 to 2021.]

Source: MoF
Note: MEHE budget chapter 2 + MEHE chapter 3 = CAPEX-maintenance

2.10 MEHE Budget outturns: % Budget executed for every budget category: 2014-2020

[Graph showing the percentage of budget execution for various categories from 2014 to 2020.]

Source: MoF
2.11 MEHE Budget outturns: % Budget executed for every budget category: 2020

Source: MoF

2.12 Subsidies to private schools

Source: MoF
2.13 Ratio of the sum of paid stipends and MFE contributions on the total MEHE budget outturns

Source: MoF (same graphs, the second one is only more detailed)
Note: paid stipends and MFE contributions in this graph are NOT part of MEHE budget. Or not all at least: stipends in MEHE budget exist but they are way less, this is the total of stipends given to all the state employees.
2.14 Outturns public teachers’ salaries by type of contract and by direction

2.15 Public Teachers’ Salaries: Budget and Outturns (%) by type of contract (salaries of Basic and Secondary direction together)

Source: MoF
2.16 Public Teachers’ Salaries: Budget by type of contract

![Graph showing budget for public teachers' salaries by type of contract from 2014 to 2020.](image)

Source: MoF

2.17 Budget Public teachers’ salaries: Contractual teachers’ salaries on Civil Servant teachers' salaries ratio (%)

![Graph showing the ratio of contractual teachers' salaries to civil servant teachers' salaries from 2010 to 2020.](image)

Source: MoF
2.18 Budget for the total of MEHE salaries

Source: MoF

2.19 Budget by category of MEHE salaries

Source: MoF
2.20 Public teachers* by contract: age distribution (density plot) 2020-21

Source: MEHE, ETF calculations
*excluded 1248 teachers without working hours and 318 teachers with 0 WHs. Excluded also 52 teachers with more than 30 WHs (unreliable). “Contractual payed by RACE” includes only 1st shift.

2.21 Public teachers* by contract: (weekly) working hours distribution (density plot) 2020-21

Source: MEHE, ETF calculations
*excluded 1248 teachers without working hours and 318 teachers with 0 WHs. Excluded also 52 teachers with more than 30 WHs (unreliable). “Contractual payed by RACE” includes only 1st shift.
2.22 Distribution of public teachers' Working Hours in public school education (all levels from pre-school to secondary)* 2020-21

Source: MEHE

*excluded 1248 teachers without working hours and 318 teachers with 0 WHs. Excluded also 52 teachers with more than 30 WHs (unreliable). "Contractual paid by RACE" includes only 1st shift.

2.23 Proportion of schools over/under occupied by region (2020-21 public schools: preschools + elementary + part of the intermediary)

Source: MEHE
2.24 Proportion of schools over/under occupied by region (2020-21 public schools: secondary + part of the intermediary)

Source: MEHE
2.25 Pupil teacher ratio public school vs. school occupation rate 2020-21

Source: MEHE, ETF calculations
Note:
Primary directorate schools are the public schools from pre-school to part of the intermediary level schools (not all of them)
Secondary directorate schools are the secondary level public schools and the rest of the intermediary level schools.
In the analysis are included only the schools where the teachers with a contract of 0 working hours are less than the 20% of the rest of the teachers with a contract with more than 0 Working Hours contract. The other schools are considered unreliable. 13 out of 1237 schools excluded (12 from primary, 1 from secondary)

Mean of pupil teacher ratio for all the schools: 10.7 (primary direction schools: 11.8; secondary direction school: 7.0)
Mean of pupil teacher ratio with occupation rate >100%: 14.3 (primary direction schools: 15.2; secondary direction school: 9.1)
Mean of pupil teacher ratio with occupation rate <=100%: 9.7 (primary direction schools: 10.7; secondary direction school: 6.6)

2.26 Ratio of total teachers working hours on number of students vs. school occupation rate 2020-21

Source: MEHE, ETF calculations

Total of 35958 public school teachers. Of these:
- 318 teachers with 0 WHs → They are counted in the analysis, but only the schools with a ratio <20% of their teachers with 0 working hours on the total of the other teachers are included in the analysis.
- 52 teachers with >30 WHs → Unreliable, the median of the WHs of their type of contract has been considered as their WHs
- 1248 teachers without info for the WHs → The median of the WHs of their type of contract has been considered as their WHs
### 2.27 Distribution of public teachers by contract and by region (all levels from pre-school to secondary) 2020-21

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Civil Servant</th>
<th>Contractual</th>
<th>Contractual paid by RACE*</th>
<th>Provided by other organisations</th>
<th>TOTAL CONTRACTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Baalbek-Hermel</td>
<td>44.2%</td>
<td>47.7%</td>
<td>5.9%</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
<td>2956</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beirut</td>
<td>43.5%</td>
<td>46.5%</td>
<td>6.4%</td>
<td>3.6%</td>
<td>1691</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bekaa</td>
<td>49.4%</td>
<td>40.5%</td>
<td>8.9%</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
<td>3049</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mount Lebanon</td>
<td>58.5%</td>
<td>35.5%</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
<td>7374</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nabatiyeh</td>
<td>44.6%</td>
<td>38.5%</td>
<td>11.7%</td>
<td>5.2%</td>
<td>4028</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North</td>
<td>36.6%</td>
<td>52.5%</td>
<td>8.9%</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
<td>12052</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>43.2%</td>
<td>46.1%</td>
<td>7.9%</td>
<td>2.8%</td>
<td>4808</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL LEBANON</td>
<td>44.9%</td>
<td>44.9%</td>
<td>7.8%</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
<td>35958</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: MEHE, “Contractual paid by RACE” includes only 1st shift.
## List of Acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CDR</td>
<td>Council for Development and Reconstruction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CERD</td>
<td>Centre for Educational Research and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DG NEAR</td>
<td>Directorate-General for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>European Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EMIS</td>
<td>Education Management Information System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ETF</td>
<td>European Training Foundation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUD</td>
<td>European Union Delegation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IT</td>
<td>Information Technology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEHE</td>
<td>Ministry of Education and Higher Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MoF</td>
<td>Ministry of Finance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEET</td>
<td>Not in Education, Employment or Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>PER</td>
<td>Public Expenditure Review</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RACE</td>
<td>Reaching All Children with Education</td>
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<tr>
<td>SIMS</td>
<td>School Information and Management System</td>
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<tr>
<td>TCM</td>
<td>Targeted Consultation Meeting</td>
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<tr>
<td>TVET</td>
<td>Technical Vocational Education and Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNRWA</td>
<td>United Nations Relief and Works Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WB</td>
<td>World Bank</td>
</tr>
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</table>