

# SKILLS AND MIGRATION COUNTRY FICHE JORDAN

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# **PREFACE**

The European Training Foundation's (ETF) Skills and Migration country fiche is intended as a first-entry evidence-based analysis of the main issues relating to the skills dimensions of migration. It is composed of three main conceptual blocks.

- It presents data, trends and challenges relating to the skills dimension of migration to provide an updated and structured state of play.
- It focuses on policy developments and practical experiences to reinforce migrants' skills. Policies and projects are analysed with reference to addressing legal labour migration needs and migration and development issues. The logic behind the analysis is to identify success factors and challenges to be addressed.
- It provides an overview of the main insights on the way forward in terms of policy and areas of intervention in the short to medium term.

The goal of the fiche is twofold. On the one hand, it aims to contribute to the broader policy dialogue on the skills dimensions of migration issues in specific countries with European Union (EU) institutions, Member States and international players. On the other hand, it serves as a reflection and communication tool in the policy dialogue of the ETF and national authorities in charge of human capital development. As such, the fiche will contribute to the policy analysis and policy-making support that the ETF provides to its partner countries in order to improve the employability of citizens via lifelong learning, including migration in this specific case.

The ETF fiches aim to cover the partner countries with whom circular and/or mobility schemes with EU countries can be established<sup>1</sup>.

More in-depth country-specific or cross-country studies may be produced as a follow-up to the fiches' findings and recommendations and to support the needs expressed by EU institutions. Further follow-up actions to the fiche could take the form of specific ETF support actions to the EU or partner countries; in line with the ETF's mandate, this might include inputs to the programming of new initiatives, content monitoring or other specific actions to be agreed.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> In 2021, the fiches cover Georgia, Jordan, Lebanon, Moldova, Morocco, Tunisia and Ukraine.



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
# **ANALYSIS**

## 1. Skills and migration overview

Jordan has historically been at the crossroads of migration, influenced by geopolitical and economic factors in its neighbourhood that have determined its migration reality and policy (De Bel-Air, 2016). Conflicts and instability in the neighbouring countries have been the main drivers of migration, while economic factors in nearby Gulf countries have also played a key role, particularly with regard to outflows. A very specific feature of migration in Jordan has been the high influx of refugees fleeing from conflicts and wars in the near neighbourhood. The absorption and management of these refugees has been one of the main concerns and priorities of the country's policies in the past 70 years.

Three significant waves have characterised recent migration history in Jordan: i) since the 1960s, emigration flows of Jordanian technicians and university graduates seeking more rewarding wages in the Gulf countries; ii) since the 1970s, flows of migrant workers, mainly from Egypt and South Asian countries; and iii) recurrent immigration waves resulting from socio-political turmoil and conflicts in the region, including inflows of Palestinians (1948 and 1967), Iraqis (2003) and Syrians (since 2011) as the more populous groups. As reported by the ETF (2017), data relating to migration are difficult to access and not comprehensive, and therefore fail to give a complete picture of migrants and migration flows characterising Jordan. This notwithstanding, the data presented in Figure 1 on international immigrant stocks as a percentage of the population show remarkable stability over time since 2010, with a slight long-term decrease from 40.3% of the population in 2005 to 33.1% in 2019. In total, in 2020 the number of immigrants amounted to 3 457 691, less than half a million of whom can be considered economic migrants. The inflow of Syrian refugees since 2014 has confirmed this pattern, with refugees consistently representing 87% of total immigrants over the past 10 years<sup>2</sup>.

FIGURE 1. GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT AND MIGRATION STOCKS (AS % OF TOTAL POPULATION), 1990–2019



Source: UN DESA International Migrant Stock 2019, World Bank (World Development Indicators)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Unless otherwise indicated, Annex I provides the sources of all the statistics in this section.



As for emigrants, in 2020 the total number was 814 909, 63% of them men. The percentage of emigrants has also remained stable at just below 8% of the total population over the past 30 years, despite the significant increase in the national income levels shown in Figure 1. Their contribution to the national external account is sizeable, with 8.9% of gross domestic product (GDP) received in remittances in 2020, although there has been a clear long-term downward trend since 1995 (World Bank figures). The Gulf countries still make up more than 70% of total emigration, with a remarkably low level of migration to Europe (see Figure 2). However, selective migration policies of countries in North America and elsewhere are attracting an increasing number of well-educated postgraduate students and young highly skilled professionals into these countries. The Jordanian National Employment Strategy (NES) states that 'the number of emigrants has been volatile over the years, affected by oil prices as well as political events'.




FIGURE 2. TOP 10 COUNTRIES OF EMIGRATION, 2020

### Source: UN DESA, International Migrant Stocks, 2020

Migrant remittances make a substantial 9.2% of GDP in 2020, even if they have halved as a percentage of GDP since the early 2000 (21.5% in 2000 and 19.0% in 2005), to a large extent thanks to the GDP growth. As for migrant remittances outflows, even if they increased in the early 2000, they are back to a modest level of 1.3% pf GDP in 2019 consistent with the high proportion of refugees (data from the World Bank).

As a consequence of this pattern of emigration and immigration, the skills composition of migration flows in Jordan is detrimental overall to the national human capital. The Jordan Labor Market Panel Survey, conducted by the Department of Statistics and the Economic Research Forum in 2010, revealed that 81.6% of emigrants hold a secondary or higher education qualification, and 54.9% have a university education. In conjunction with the prevailing influx of low- and semi-skilled immigrants, this prevalence of highly skilled migration has a negative long-term impact on the Jordanian skills structure and availability (ETF, 2020). The high number of Syrian refugees arriving since 2015 has reinforced this pattern: they come mainly from the agricultural regions in the south of Syria and their average qualification level is very low, while the more qualified refugees have tended to migrate to Europe.

Despite the above-mentioned scarcity of data on the Jordanian emigrant profile, it appears that the primary reason for emigration is economic. People with a higher level of education have more chance of being employed in Jordan, but also of being unemployed. In 2019, data on unemployment by educational level showed that the average rate of unemployment for low-skilled individuals was 17.4% compared with 24.5% for highly skilled people (with a significant difference between the rates for men



and women, at 19.2% and 32.0%, respectively)3. Indeed, Jordan is a country characterised by job creation in low-skilled and low-paid jobs that do not fit the aspirations of young Jordanians with a university degree (De Bel-Air, 2016). Moreover, most highly educated job seekers do not have the skills required to match the needs of the Jordanian labour market, being specialised in occupations that are already saturated (lawyers, doctors, information technology specialists, businesspeople). The Jordanian labour market does not offer them enough opportunities and, as a result, they look for job opportunities abroad, and particularly in the Gulf countries (ETF, 2017). In fact, these countries have traditionally been considered an extension of the local labour market, particularly for skilled and experienced professionals (De Bel-Air, 2016). Since 2008–2009, however, the indigenisation of most of the Gulf countries' labour markets, increasing competition from Asian professionals, the international economic crisis, and the Syrian refugee crisis since 2012 have led to a decrease in the number of job opportunities in these countries, confronting more young graduates from universities or skilled technicians with the challenge of finding decent jobs in Jordan. Furthermore, the GDP growth rate has plunged from an average of 7.21% during the period 2003-2009 to around 2% in the last years, well below the 6.5% GDP growth required to absorb some 100 000-120 000 new Jordanian entrants annually into the labour market. The COVID-19 crisis has worsened the situation, generating negative growth of -1.6% of GDP in 2020, according to the World Bank.

Thus, future emigration to the Gulf countries is unpredictable and depends on the interaction of two countervailing forces: i) the 'nationalisation' of jobs in Gulf countries, which is a slow but steady process; and ii) the prospect of Jordan joining the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), which might open Gulf countries' labour markets to Jordanians. This latter prospect would risk consolidating Jordan as a peripheral skills-producing country for the labour needs of the GCC countries, with fewer chances to upgrade the skills profile of its national productive system. Regarding return flows, various factors have influenced the decision to return to Jordan. At the start of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020, many Jordanians are reported to have decided to return, but data and trends on this phenomenon are not yet available. The immigration policies of receiving countries represent another key factor of return. For instance, during the First Gulf War in 1990–1991, Kuwait and other Gulf countries expelled around 300 000 Jordanians.

As for economic immigration, setting aside refugees (large numbers of whom join the informal labour market), it amounts to less than 5% of the total population and comes mainly from Egypt, Iraq, Syria and South Asian countries. The arrival of foreign workers started in the 1970s, but quantitative information has been made available only after 1997, when such workers were included in the labour force survey. For the most part, labour immigrants have engaged in low-skilled jobs that Jordanians are reluctant to take. Traditionally, Jordanians seek jobs in the public sector or job opportunities in the private sector offering similar conditions to the public sector in terms of stability, prestige and working hours (ETF, 2017). Most of these jobs are not available to foreign workers. Therefore, low-skilled immigrants have become a fundamental component of the labour market, typically in agriculture, domestic services and construction. Although the Ministry of Labour (MoL) has overall responsibility for registering all foreign workers and granting work permits for a fixed fee that is set for each sector, information is limited. It should also be added that before the Syrian crisis in 2012, Syrians could enter the country freely, which makes it even more difficult to determine real numbers. United Nations (UN) data indicate that in 2019, the largest groups of immigrants were Palestinians (long-term residents, with a total population of more than 2 million people and a very high average qualification level),

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> ETF calculation on Department of Statistics data, LFS online database.



followed by Syrians (724 000), Iraqis and Egyptians (the latter two groups being at the bottom end of the qualifications spectrum). Quotas per economic sector are set by law for migrant workers, but the numbers of Egyptians and South Asians have been continuously increasing in the 'quota sectors'. For instance, the percentage of immigrants working in the Qualifying Industry Zone (QIZ) factories has fluctuated between 75.5% and 78.7%, well above the 70% quota (ETF, 2017). The picture is more blurred in less controlled sectors and in sectors with high percentages of informality, such as construction. The proliferation of informality is a source of concern. Even before the Syrian refugee crisis, the informal sector in Jordan accounted for over one quarter of the country's GDP (ETF, 2020), and it has probably increased since then.

Finally, by far the largest group of immigrants in Jordan has historically been refugees from neighbouring countries. Jordan is not a signatory of the 1951 Geneva Convention on refugees or the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) statute of 1950. Refugees' status is therefore mainly determined by its Constitution and the legislation on foreigners (Law of 1973). Access to residence, employment, public education and healthcare is not automatic, and this results in different legal treatments of refugees depending on several factors. The first group of refugees started to reach Jordan in 1948 from Palestine; most of them are registered with the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) and enjoy full rights as citizens, including access to education and training. The Palestinians from the Gaza Strip and the West Bank who arrived after 1967, after the adoption of the nationality law of 1954, have access to basic services, including public primary and secondary education and health services, under the same conditions as 'uninsured Jordanians' (40–50% of the health services are subsidised in Jordanian medical centres), but access to employment is subject to certain conditions. For Iraqis, Syrians, Sudanese and Somalis, the legal framework is represented by the 1998 Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) (renewed in 2003 and 2014) between the UNHCR and Jordan. The MoU stipulates the obligation of the UNHCR to determine the status of refugees and asylum seekers and ensure their protection. It should be noted that Syrian refugees registered with the UNHCR cannot obtain residency, which limits their potential opportunities to find (legal) employment. Labour market integration of the refugee population is one of the key policy, political and social challenges for the country, and the prevailing integration into the informal labour market is leading to a massive underutilisation of refugees' skills.

In 2014, Jordan was the first country to carry out a Household International Migration Survey (HIMS) according to the common methodology of MED-HIMS (Household International Migration Surveys in the Mediterranean countries programme), funded by the EU. A second round of the survey is planned.

# 2. National policy framework

Jordan has no overarching national migration policy as such. However, as explained above, massive inflows of refugees and, to a lesser extent, of low-skilled economic immigrants and regular outflows of highly skilled emigrants are salient features of Jordan's economy and labour market, albeit that they are largely determined by geopolitical factors. Therefore, employment and human resources development policies have formally incorporated the country's approach to migration, particularly emigration, which for a long time has been regarded as a way to alleviate the pressure on the labour market. Indeed, successive Jordanian governments have historically encouraged the sending of skilled workers to the Gulf and the rest of the world based on a perceived positive impact on the economy (through remittances and helping to alleviate unemployment among university graduates). However, no articulate process of monitoring and evaluation of the impact of migration on those policies has been put in place. On the external front, since the late 1990s the Ministry of Foreign



Affairs and Expatriates has signed labour agreements with several GCC countries (see Annex III, Table 1).

With regard to foreigners, the reference legislation is the Law on Residence and Foreigners' Affairs (1973), which stipulates that foreigners must enter the country with a visa and that professional recruitment is based on each entrant acquiring a valid (one-year, renewable) residency permit. The 1996 Labour Law puts some barriers on foreign work and a ban on the employment of non-Jordanian workers in the country (article 12), unless they possess experience and qualifications that cannot be found among Jordanians or there is a qualifications supply gap. Furthermore, among foreigners, priority is given to Arab nationals (see Annex III, Table 2). Although not regulated in the Labour Law, the sponsorship system (*kafala*), whereby any foreign worker must be sponsored by a national, is widely used in practice, except in the QIZs (ETF, 2017).

The large influx of refugees from Syria has called for policies to be revised and to incorporate specific measures to address this group, partly in response to the commitments made within the framework of the EU-Jordan Compact signed in 2016. The compact called for a new assistance paradigm that aimed to turn the Syrian crisis into a development opportunity, promoting economic development and job opportunities for both Jordanians and Syrians. To this end, within the compact framework, Jordan agreed to formalise the work of 200 000 Syrian workers against financial and economic benefits from international donors, as well as a reduction in the cost of the annual work permit for Syrian refugees. In order to facilitate the formalisation of Syrian workers who were reluctant to engage with an employer for one full year, special work permits were issued in the construction and agricultural sectors at special low fees. The Independent Monitor's Assessment Report of the Jordan Compact and Brussels meetings (Agulhas, 2019) provides a comprehensive overview of progress in its implementation and highlights what has worked and what could be improved in different areas benefiting from the support, including education. Overall, the policy framework is considered an important step forward as it targets not only Syrian refugees, but also vulnerable groups and hosting communities. Syrians have been able to benefit from education, at least at compulsory age, and new schools have been constructed in the camps. The sustainability of funding for schools in camps and for school shifts in host communities has been reinforced thanks to multidonor funding supporting the state budget available for education. Furthermore, the Ministry of Education (MoE) has provided technical support to education delivered in the camps. The same report indicates that some challenges still exist linked in terms of: i) access, as not all principals accept Syrian refugees in schools: ii) qualifications, as there are doubts about Jordanian qualifications being subsequently accepted in Syria; and iii) the quality of education, with some teachers in the camps lacking the necessary experience, and classrooms sometimes overcrowded. The double shift system presents some issues, as afternoon shifts are shorter and have no breaks.

The prominence of measures in response to the Syrian crisis is visible in both the Human Resource Development Strategy 2025, which unfortunately has not been implemented in practice, and the NES 2011–2020<sup>4</sup>. The latter includes some adaptations to labour legal frameworks for refugees. It also provides a thorough analysis of emigrants, immigrants and refugees from the perspective of their presence in the labour market, risks and opportunities, and specific actions. With regard to emigrants, the document recognises the difficulty of obtaining a complete picture. The NES also analyses the costs, benefits and drawbacks of brain drain and brain gain (see final section). Adaptations to labour policies and related laws have also affected other foreign workers, in particular lower-skilled Egyptian

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> https://www.ilo.org/dyn/youthpol/en/equest.fileutils.dochandle?p\_uploaded\_file\_id=171



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workers who have become more exposed to the risk of unemployment owing to stronger competition from relatively more qualified Syrian refugees (Hartnett, 2019).

While immigrants who possess residence and work permits have access to public services, including education and training, the urgent need to provide skills development services to refugees has become a core item on the agenda. The Government of Jordan has deployed commendable efforts in this regard, and the Jordan Response Plans for the Syrian crisis (the first one covering the period 2018–2020 and the second one the period 2020–2022) are important steps forward in addressing this challenge. The most recent plan presents the main achievements, including:

- the legal framework the Education Development Strategy (EDS) and related bylaws that targets vulnerable groups in the broader sense, including refugees;
- the non-formal educational opportunities and remedial programmes such as the Drop-out programme and the Catch-up programme (although coverage of both programmes is low; see Jordan Response Plan, p. 39);
- a reinforcement of in-service training for teachers and the establishment of technical committees to support the formulation of plans for reforms, including education and teaching standards;
- broader access to universities for Syrian refugees.

With regard to skills development and access to education and training, the Jordan Response Plan calls on all sectors to design their strategies and plans to reflect inclusion, access and integration.

The overall policy framework for human resources development is the Vision for Talent Driven Prosperity: National Strategy for Human Resources Development 2016–2025. This strategy does not distinguish between Jordanian citizens and migrants. The document makes some contextual references to emigrants, diaspora bonds and data on university students emigrating, but it does not provide for specific policies or measures for migrants, including returning migrants. In contrast, there is a special focus on Syrian refugees, providing for specific actions in the areas of access and enrolment rates. Similarly, other sectoral strategies, such as the EDS, make specific reference to Syrian refugees.

In this respect, the EDS provides for improved access to and enrolment in education for Syrians. The strategy includes contextual information on refugees, the vast majority being Syrians, and on their needs in terms of both new school places required and special education needs emerging for children who have experienced disruption in education and who suffer from trauma. Education is provided both through the public education system and within the schools in the camps (similarly to Palestinian refugees through the UNRWA).

The Employment-Technical and Vocational Education and Training (E-TVET) Strategy 2014–2020, formulated with an operational action plan of the Technical and Vocational Skills Development Commission (adopted in 2019, but not yet public), incorporates specific actions for migrants in areas aimed at improving inclusiveness. Among its targets are the recruitment of qualified teachers and trainers among migrants, and giving access to migrants to formal and non-formal training. Key actions include skills audits for migrants, recognition of qualifications, and access to occupational licences. Within the strategy, the large influx of refugees is presented as one of the factors that is putting increasing pressure on the labour market and creating competition in employment opportunities in professions related to vocational education and training (VET).



However, the actual implementation of action plans to operationalise these strategies in relation to migrants is generally lagging behind, and monitoring and implementation of the results of actions taken are very limited. Despite 'migration mainstreaming' into national sectoral strategies, there is a conspicuous absence of policies and measures in support of circular migration as a lever for brain gain. Furthermore, opportunities for the upskilling of guest workers are very limited, and there is a lack of proper recognition of their prior, non-formal and informal learning and skills. At the time of drafting this fiche, the skills of immigrants could be tested only upon an official request from the MoL for each immigrant individually, or within the framework of project-related agreements with international organisations and agencies that provide training to Syrian refugees (ETF, 2020).

Regarding governance of migration, Jordan does not have a specialised migration institution. Instead, the responsibility for the management of emigration is split among various institutions (see Annex III, Table 4). Private recruitment agencies (73 are officially registered in the country, but there are many others that are unregistered) are important actors in the management of international emigration, which is often supported by diaspora networks. The MoL also supports and facilitates emigration (ETF, 2017). For foreign workers, the MoL regulates and grants work permits, and tries to contain undocumented entrants. By law, employers must request a work permit and pay a fee for each migrant worker, in addition to offering at least one complete year of full-time employment. Finally, regarding refugees and asylum seekers, the actors responsible for assisting them include primarily the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation. The international community is also very active in this field, primarily through the work of the UNRWA and UNHCR (see Annex III, Table 5).

## 3. Cooperation projects on skills and migration

The substantial funding, primarily from the EU, that was available in response to the inflow of Syrian refugees after 2012 opened up opportunities for project initiatives in the field of education and training at various levels, as well as initiatives in areas such as qualifications, the recognition of prior learning, work-based learning, and the quality of education and training. In some cases, initiatives are multidonor funded and multipurpose, which makes it difficult to have a clear and complete inventory.

In the framework of the Mobility Partnership signed between Jordan and the EU in 2014, a flagship project is JEMPAS, which focuses on strengthening the capacity of the Government of Jordan to implement and develop its migration policy. Its specific objectives include: i) to reach out and engage more with Jordanian expatriates; and ii) to deploy efforts to prevent human trafficking. Component 1 of JEMPAS includes a skills dimension and, more specifically, it seeks to develop an expatriate profile, which would also include information on skills levels (among others) and provide the basis for a national strategy on skills and migration.

Among Jordan's Migrant Support Measures from a Skills and Employment Perspective (MISMES) identified by the ETF (2017), only 5 out of 35 target Jordanian emigrants, and the 7 MISMES targeting economic immigrants focus mainly on protecting their labour rights (Better Work, Integrated Programme on Fair Recruitment (FAIR), Migration and Governance Network (Magnet); see Annex II for details), rather than developing and optimising their skills. All other MISMES target refugees and asylum seekers, although all such programmes must include a minimum of 30% of beneficiaries among vulnerable members of local host communities in addition to the Syrian or Iraqi refugees. These latter MISMES usually comprise technical and vocational training and skills development, and constitute a formidable 'test lab' for skills and migration initiatives. Among these MISMES are several innovative ideas and individual good practices, but they largely remain pilot schemes reaching only a



small fraction of the potential target population. The number of MISMES beneficiaries remains extremely low, both in individual programmes and in aggregate terms (ETF, 2017). A more systematic and structured monitoring and evaluation of these initiatives might provide solid evidence for action in the future.

## **ETF** support

The ETF has been active in Jordan since 2000, when its geographical mandate was extended to the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean countries. Its work in the country has focused mainly on supporting the reform and modernisation of the education and training systems. Recently, the ETF has been working with the main stakeholders in the Jordanian education and training sector to develop a national qualifications framework, which has been endorsed and is currently under the coordination of the Agency for Quality Assurance and Accreditation of Higher Education Institutions. In parallel, it has implemented a regional programme, Qualifications for the Mediterranean, aimed at co-constructing common profiles for specific occupations in economic sectors with a high degree of mobility (construction and hospitality sectors). The complementary work on the recognition of qualifications (see the E-TVET Strategy) is also an important area on which Jordan is working with the support of international donors.

In 2017 the ETF produced a study on MISMES in Jordan. This study was a first step towards a more in-depth analysis of the skills of migrants and how skills are impacting the human capital stock and its development, and the implications for the country's socioeconomic development. A further, follow-up analysis of measures currently in place and the state of play of those already identified may assist in the definition of a clearer map of the support available for the skills of migrants.



# THE WAY FORWARD

National sectoral strategies in the field of employment, TVET and education fully integrate the reality of immigration (mainly for Syrian refugees since 2015) and, to a lesser extent, emigration. However, the challenge remains to develop a national skills and migration strategy that optimises the human capital development outcomes of migration flows. The main obstacles to achieving this are the persistent mismatch between labour needs and qualifications supply in the national labour market, which pushes many graduates to leave for Gulf countries and beyond, and the challenges of integrating the high number of refugees into the labour market and upgrading the skills profile of immigrants.

The Jordanian authorities are making commendable efforts to host and integrate growing numbers of migrants and refugees seeking asylum or economic opportunities. However, there remain several challenges that prevent migrants and refugees from contributing to the economy and labour market to the fullest extent (ETF, 2020). One problem is the absorption capacity, in terms of both the public budget and public services, including education and training, but also job opportunities. The other issue is linked to the effect on the stock of human capital in Jordan, given that most immigrants are low skilled, in contrast to the highly skilled Jordanians who are leaving the country. The pressure on the labour market of historical groups of both immigrants and refugees is of great concern for Jordan, and together with other challenges experienced in the labour market, it remains one of the key priority areas to be addressed.

The NES gives a very thorough diagnosis of the human capital implications of emigration for the country. With regard to brain drain costs, it underlines that: i) the investment in emigrants during university studies is to the benefit of receiving countries; ii) sending high-skilled workers could, in the long term, create shortages in the labour force for high-skilled jobs, and lower productivity; iii) it potentially results in lower motivation to look for a job as households can benefit from remittances. Regarding brain gain, the strategy refers to the decrease in unemployment pressure, particularly for university graduates, and the creation of positive networks such as trade, technology adoption and incentives for households to invest in building human capital. The strategy suggests that Jordan could further work on encouraging brain circulation, for instance with mechanisms for individuals to maintain strong links with Jordan (investments, technology transfer, etc.) and potentially to return to Jordan within their working life to provide professional and managerial skills. However, there is no clear picture of the status of implementation of the NES, and at the time of drafting this fiche there is no strategy for the coming period.

Overall, the key recommendations formulated in the MISMES study in 2017 are still largely valid.

- Jordanian emigration at all stages, including the return of migrants. The importance of retaining highly skilled human capital in upgrading the economy from low- to higher-value-added production in the longer term requires a national reflection on how to manage high-skilled emigration. The substantial flow of remittances is counterbalanced by the costs of brain drain, which has become a structural feature of the Jordanian economy.
- Develop a comprehensive immigrant labour strategy. As for emigration, Jordan needs to develop a shared vision based on a wide consensus on the role of immigrant workers in the country's economic development. There is a need to better understand labour and skills shortages, in terms of both Jordanian and non-Jordanian workers, and to adapt guidance, training and employment programmes and services to market needs.



- Develop more integrated approaches, and more coherently. The high number of initiatives in support of skills development, particularly for refugees, has led to a greater focus on quantity, while mechanisms for evaluating impact and effectiveness are lacking. A platform is needed to bring together and coordinate all the different interventions and ensure alignment; this would lead to stronger coherence and more integrated approaches.
- Put in place a monitoring system of current measures and actions in support of skills for emigrants and refugees to analyse their impact and identify required adjustments. More than six years after the supply shock created by the arrival of massive numbers of Syrian refugees and the adoption of numerous MISMES to better integrate them, it is necessary to systematically collect information on the measures implemented and the follow-up and evaluation of their results. The Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation is well placed to undertake this function (ETF, 2017).



# **ANNEX I: STATISTICAL ANNEX**



General economic and demographic indicators

		1990	1995	2000	2005	2010	2015	2019	2020
1	GDP (current USD million)	4 160.00	6 727.45	8 460.42	12 585.67	27 133.80	38 587.02	44 502.90	m
2	GDP per person employed (constant 2017 purchasing power parity USD)	m	38 899.52	39 912.81	49 174.11	49 489.52	46 404.41	46 174.60	m
3	Total population at mid-year and by age group	3 565 890	4 588 843	5 122 493	5 765 635	7 261 539	9 266 575	10 101 694	10 203 140
	0–19 (%)	57.8	52.0	50.9	48.8	47.6	46.1	43.7	43.0
	20-64 (%)	39.0	45.1	46.0	47.9	48.7	50.2	52.4	53.0
	65+ (%)	3.2	2.9	3.1	3.3	3.6	3.8	3.9	4.0

#### Key migration indicators

		1990	1995	2000	2005	2010	2015	2019	2020
4a	Total emigrants	313 997	339 346	368 562	434 172	597 431	705 353	784 377	814 909
4b	International migrants: emigrants (% of total population)	8.8	7.4	7.2%	7.5	8.2	7.6	7.8	8.0
	Emigrants by sex								
5a	Females (emigrants)	126 581	133 557	142 240	161 083	212 446	254 490	284 055	297 955
5b	Females (as a % of total emigrants)	40.3	39.4	38.6	37.1	35.6	36.1	36.2	36.6
5c	Males (emigrants)	187 416	205 789	226 322	273 089	384 985	450 863	500 322	516 954
5d	Males (as a % of total emigrants)	59.7	60.6	61.4	62.9	64.4	63.9	63.8	63.4
6a	Total immigrants	1 146 349	1 537 097	1 927 845	2 325 414	2 722 983	3 112 026	3 346 703	3 457 69
6b	International migrants: immigrants (% of total population)	32.1	33.5	37.6	40.3	37.5	33.6	33.1	33.9
	Immigrants by sex								
7a	Females (immigrants)	559 876	752 372	944 868	1 141 769	1 338 670	1 544 849	1 661 345	1 701 05
7b	Females (as a % of total immigrants)	48.8	48.9	49.0	49.1	49.2	49.6	49.6	49.2
7c	Males (immigrants)	586 473	784 725	982 977	1 183 645	1 384 313	1 567 177	1 685 358	1 756 63
7d	Males (as a % of total immigrants)	51.2	51.1	51.0	50.9	50.8	50.4	50.4	50.8
8	Immigrants by age group								
	0–19 (%)	48.5	47.7	47.2	47.2	47.2	47.9	48.5	49.2
	20-64 (%)	47.5	48.3	48.7	48.7	48.7	47.1	45.9	44.8
	65+ (%)	4.1	4.1	4.1	4.1	4.1	5.0	5.5	5.9
9a	Refugees (including asylum seekers) at mid-year	929 482	1 250 358	1 571 234	1 972 086	2 372 937	2 751 479	2 928 724	3 017 40
96	Refugees (including asylum seekers) as a % of the international migrant stock (immigrants)	81.1	81.3	81.5	84.8	87.1	88.4	87.5	87.3
10a	Personal remittances, received (current USD million)	499.27	1 243.99	1 845.1 3	2 420.87	3 622.96	5 348.31	4 389.30	m
10ь	Personal remittances, received (% of GDP)	12.0	18.5	21.8	19.2	13.4	13.9	9.9	m
11a	Personal remittances, paid (current USD million)	70.52	107.06	197.46	349.22	605.21	596.76	574.79	m
11b	Personal remittances, paid (% of GDP)	1.7	1.6	2.3	2.8	2.2	1.5	1.3	m

		1990–1995	1995–2000	2000-2005	2005–2010	2010–2015	2015-2020
12	Net number of migrants	412 472	-150 149	-93 910	649 995	1 056 759	51 099
	Annual rate of change of the migrant stock (%)	5.9	4.5	3.7	3.2	2.7	1.8
14	Annual rate of change of the refugee stock (including asylum seekers)	5.9	4.6	4.5	3.7	3.0	1.4

		2020
5a	Total emigrants	814 909
5a	Main destination re	gions
	Asia	621 837
	North America	105 518
	Europe	48 131
	Main destination cou	ıntries
	Saudi Arabia	240 606
	United Arab Emirates	168 968
	United States of America	91 208
	Palestine*	59 543
	Kuwait	54 688
	Qatar	32 808
	Oman	21 868
	Libya	21 783
	Bahrain	17 769
	Canada	14 310

	2020
Total immigrants	3 457 691
Main countries of	of origin
Palestine*	2 272 411
Syrian Arab Republic	698 701
raq	206 047
Egypt	101 340
Yemen	29 708
China	20 896
Libya	19 564
ndonesia	19 024
Sri Lanka	12 559
Bangladesh	11 693

	Migration of tertiary-level students	2000	2005	2010	2015	2018	2019
16	Inbound mobility rate (%)	8.5	9.9	11.1	12.9	14.0	m
17	Outbound mobility ratio (%)	8.2	5.6	6.1	7.2	8.3	m
18	Total inbound mobile tertiary students	12 155	21 481	27 437	40 378	44 802	40 544
19	Total outbound mobile tertiary students	11 604	12 275	15 141	22 399	26 484	m
20	Net flow of internationally mobile tertiary students	551	9 206	12 296	17 979	18 318	m

21a	Inbound tertiary students per cou top five available cou	
	Palestine*	8 290
	Iraq	6 969
	Syrian Arab Republic	6 704
	Kuwait	3 943
	Qatar	3 030

21b	Outbound tertiary students per destination country (2018, top five available countries)						
	Saudi Arabia (2019)	3 016					
	United States	2 420					
	Ukraine (2019)	1 895					
	United Kingdom	1 806					
	Malaysia (2019)	1 758					

#### Last update: end of May 2021

Indicators: 1, 2, 10a, 10b, 11a, 11b – World Bank (World Development Indicators)

Indicators: 3, 12 - UN DESA, World Population Prospects 2019<sup>5</sup>

Indicators: 4a, 4b, 5a, 5b, 5c, 5d, 6a, 6b, 7a, 7b, 7c, 7d, 8, 9a, 9b, 13, 14, 15a, 15b - UN DESA, International Migrant Stock

Indicators: 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21a, 21b – UNESCO

Notes: "Not all the countries of origin and destination are available

Legend: m = missing data; "This designation shall not be construed as recognition of a State of Palestine and is without prejudice to the individual position of the Member States on this issue.

This data collection is intended to give a short but comprehensive description of the dynamics of immigration and emigration inserted in the economic and sociodemographic context of the country. Most of the indicators cover the period 1990-2020, a period long enough to observe significant demographic and migratory changes. A five-year gap between one detection and another has been left in order to make the data description as concise as possible. The 2019 values for all the indicators are also collected (where available) in order to facilitate comparability with the economic and 'international mobile students' indicators for which 2019 (or in some cases 2018) is the last available

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> https://population.un.org/wpp/

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/data/estimates2/estimates19.asp

<sup>7</sup> https://www.un.org/development/desa/pd/content/international-migrant-stock

The major limitation of this data collection relates to the lack of available and comparable indicators for migrants' skills and qualifications. Indicators for migrants' skills exist, but most of the time they come from specific national surveys and/or studies regarding a specific target group, year and country.

The UNESCO indicators for tertiary-level students who migrate with the aim of studying abroad, also referred to as 'international mobile students', have been collected as an attempt to address this lack of information on migrants' skills. Although these indicators represent only part of the skills dimension, they are nevertheless regularly updated and they describe a specific aspect of migration.

The UN DESA database has been used as source for the demographic, migration stock and refugee indicators. The economic indicators come from the World Bank database. The UNESCO database is the source for the international mobile students indicators.

General economic and demographic indicators

	Description	Definition
1	GDP (current USD million)	GDP at purchasers' prices is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of natural resources. Data are in current USD. Dollar figures for GDP are converted from domestic currencies using single year official exchange rates.
2	GDP per person employed (constant 2017 purchasing power parity USD)	GDP per person employed is GDP divided by total employment in the economy. Purchasing power parity GDP is GDP converted to 2017 constant international dollars using purchasing power parity rates. An international dollar has the same purchasing power over GDP that a US dollar has in the United States.
3	Total population at mid-year and by age group	Estimates of the total population, as of 1 July, expressed as a number and as a percentage of the total for the age groups 0–19, 20–64 and 65+.

#### Key migration indicators

	Description	Definition
4a, 5a, 5c	Total emigrants, females (emigrants), males (emigrants)	International migrant stock (emigrants) at mid-year, both sexes, females and males.
	International migrants: emigrants (% of total population)	The number of international migrants (emigrants) divided by the total population. Data are expressed as percentages.
	Females/males (as a % of total emigrants)	The number of female/male emigrants females/males divided by the total number of international migrants (emigrants).
	Total immigrants, females (immigrants), males (immigrants)	International migrant stock (immigrants) at mid-year, both sexes, females and males.
6b	International migrants: immigrants (% of total population)	The number of international migrants (immigrants) divided by the total population. Data are expressed as percentages.
	Females/males (as a % of total immigrants)	The number of female/male immigrants divided by the total number of international migrants (immigrants).
8	Immigrants by age group	The number of immigrants in a particular age group expressed as percentage of the total number of international migrants (immigrants). Age groups: 0–19, 20–64 and 65+.
	Refugees (including asylum seekers) at mid- year	Estimated refugee stock. This stock is a subset of the stock of international migrants (immigrants).
	Refugees (including asylum seekers) as a percentage of the international migrant stock (immigrants)	Estimated of the number of refugees as a percentage of the immigrant stock. These two indicators are based on the end-of-year 2017 estimates of refugee populations or persons in refugee-like situations prepared by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and, where appropriate, by the United Nations

		Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA).
10a/b	Personal remittances, received (current USD million/% of GDP)	Inflow of personal remittances in the country expressed in current USD million and as a percentage of GDP. Personal remittances comprise personal transfers and compensation of employees. Personal transfers consist of all current transfers in cash or in kind made or received by resident households to or from non-resident households. Personal transfers thus include all current transfers between resident and non-resident individuals. Compensation of employees refers to the income of border, seasonal, and other short-term workers who are employed in an economy where they are not resident and of residents employed by non-resident entities. Data are the sum of two items defined in the sixth edition of the International Monetary Fund's Balance of Payments Manual: personal transfers and compensation of employees.
11a/b	Personal remittances, paid (current USD million/% of GDP)	Outflow of personal remittances in the country expressed in current USD million and as a percentage of GDP. Personal remittances comprise personal transfers and compensation of employees. Personal transfers consist of all current transfers in cash or in kind made or received by resident households to or from non-resident households. Personal transfers thus include all current transfers between resident and non-resident individuals. Compensation of employees refers to the income of border, seasonal, and other shorterm workers who are employed in an economy where they are not resident and of residents employed by non-resident entities. Data are the sum of two items defined in the sixth edition of the International Monetary Fund's Balance of Payments Manual: personal transfers and compensation of employees.
12	Net number of migrants	Estimated number of immigrants minus the number of emigrants.
13	Annual rate of change of the migrant stock (%)	Estimated exponential annual rate of change of the international migrant stock (immigrants), expressed as a percentage.
14	Annual rate of change of the refugee stock (including asylum seekers)	Estimated exponential rate of change of the refugee population (including asylum seekers) per year expressed as a percentage.
15a	Main destination regions and countries	Top 10 destination countries (and top 3 destination continents) for emigrants in the last available year with their respective number of international migrants.
15b	Main countries of origin	Top 10 countries of origin for immigrants in the last available year with their respective number of international migrants.
16	Inbound mobility rate (%)	Number of tertiary students from abroad studying in a given country, expressed as a percentage of total tertiary enrolment in that country.
17	Outbound mobility ratio (%)	Number of students from a given country studying abroad, expressed as a percentage of total tertiary enrolment in that country.
18	Total inbound mobile tertiary students	Total number of tertiary students from abroad studying in the country.
19	Total outbound mobile tertiary students	Total number of tertiary students from the country studying abroad.
20	Net flow of internationally mobile tertiary students	Number of tertiary students from abroad (inbound students) studying in a given country minus the number of students at the same level from a given country studying abroad (outbound students).
21a/b	Inbound/outbound tertiary students per country of origin	Top five origin/destination countries of mobile tertiary students with their respective number of mobile students (last available year).



# **ANNEX II: LIST OF RELEVANT PROJECTS**

This list is not exhaustive and includes selected projects specifically targeting the development of skills of migrants as mentioned in section 3.

Project title	Implementing agency	Amount and/or source of funding	Duration	Main activities	Beneficiaries
JEMPAS Support to the Mobility Partnership between the European Union and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan (JEMPAS) - ICMPD	ICMPD partnering with MoFAE, MoL and the Jordanian embassies	€2.5 million (shared with the anti-trafficking component) EU Mobility Partnership	2016– 2019	Developing an online platform for expatriates, a communication plan and tools for the engagement of expatriates Improving services to the diaspora through counselling and the development of a new engagement strategy (component 1)	MoFAE and the Jordanian diaspora
Better Work Jordan programme Better Work Jordan: Our programme - Better Work	International Labour Organization (ILO), International Finance Corporation and local partners (MoL, trade unions, the garment industry, etc.)	\$5.3 million (2008–2013) US Agency for International Development, Human Resources and Skills Development Canada, US Department of Labour, MoL	2008– 2017	Assessment of workplace conditions Providing advisory and training services to employers, MoL inspectors and workers	Workers of 65 QIZ garment factories, MoL inspectors
Enhancing the capacity of the Workers' Center to serve the needs of immigrant workers  Enhancing the capacity of the Workers' Center to respond to the needs of migrant workers (ilo.org)	ILO, garment union and non- governmental organisations (NGOs)	\$710 413  Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) and Department for International Development (UK) (DFID)	2015– 2018	Enhancement of administrative, financial and human resources systems Providing health and psychosocial services, self-supported education, language and computer skills training, and recreational activities	Workers in the garment sector in the AI-Hassan QIZ (Irbid)
Integrated Programme on Fair Recruitment (FAIR) Integrated Programme on Fair Recruitment (FAIR) (ilo.org)	ILO, MoL	\$3.8 million SDC	2015– 2018	Providing migrant workers with access to reliable information and services Disseminating global and national knowledge about recruitment, and engagement with the media (pilot targeting migrant workers from Nepal)	Migrant workers in Jordan, Tunisia, Nepal and the Philippines
Magnet programme (Regional programme: Jordan, Lebanon, Yemen, GCC) Migration and Governance Network - MAGNET (ilo.org)	ILO	\$3.1 million for all countries  SDC (main)	2012– 2015	Generating data and information that facilitate and/or enhance the mechanisms of migration policies Making recommendations for the improvement of	Destination governments, trade unions, civil society organisations, media professionals, migrant workers



Project title	Implementing agency	Amount and/or source of funding	Duration	Main activities	Beneficiaries
				migrants' working conditions Training media professionals, inspectors and civil society organisations	
Domestic Workers Solidarity Network Solidarity Center - Migrant Domestic Workers Network a First in Jordan	Solidarity Center (US NGO), Adaleh (local NGO)	N/A Catholic Relief Services	2014– 2016	Providing training to domestic workers' leaders from the largest communities in Jordan, covering workers' rights and anti-human trafficking Helping domestic workers to find legal assistance and building worker networks  Establishing a legal clinic to assist the networks	42 community leaders of domestic workers
UNRWA TVET programmes – two community colleges and VET centres (Amman Naour and Wadi Seer)  Wadi Seer Training Centre   UNRWA	UNRWA	\$7.5 million per year International donors (mainly EU and USA)	Since 1961 in Jordan	Training refugees in vocational and technical skills to become skilled/semi-skilled professionals Providing employment support to graduates through the UNRWA's Placement and Career Guidance Unit	Palestinian refugees, including non- Jordanian 1967 'ex- Gazans', annually 1 200–1 400 students in each centre
UNRWA Faculty of Educational Sciences and Arts UNRWA   FESA	UNRWA	N/A International donors (mainly EU and USA)	Since 1971	Education and training of teachers	Palestinian refugees, including non- Jordanian 1967 'ex- Gazans'
Community Development and Support Programme  Programme evaluation: Jordanian Community Development and Support Program – Final Evaluation – Dec 2017 – CARE   Evaluations (careevaluations.org)	Care International, Vocational Training Centre	N/A Canada and other international donors	Since 2003 for Iraqis Since 2013 for Syrians	Referral to the Vocational Training Centre and specialised agencies for vocational and technical training and life skills coaching, inside and outside Azraq camp	



# **ANNEX III: LEGAL FRAMEWORK**

TABLE 1: LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE EMIGRATION OF JORDANIANS

Laws and regulations	Bilateral agreements	Multilateral agreements	Rights and settlement
Emigration: Constitution of 1952, article 9 Diaspora: Social Security Law No. 30 of 1978 (amended in 2010 and 2014) Citizenship law allowing dual nationality	Labour agreement with Qatar (1997) Labour agreement with Kuwait (2001) Labour agreement with the United Arab Emirates (2006) Labour agreement with other (minor) Arab receiving countries	EU–Jordan Mobility Partnership Declaration (signed on 9 October 2014)	Constitutional freedom to travel and reside abroad Access to social security for expatriates (Law No 30 of 1978) Regulation of private recruitment agencies Validation of migrants' diplomas and work experience No participation in elections without residence in Jordan

Source: ETF (2017), p.12.

TABLE 2: LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR FOREIGN IMMIGRANT WORKERS IN JORDAN

Laws and regulations	Bilateral agreements	Multilateral agreements	Rights and settlement
Working conditions Labour Law of 1996 (amended in 2008, 2009 for domestic and agriculture workers) MoL's list of 'closed occupation' sectors MoL's migrant worker quotas by open sectors and work permit fees Social Security Law of 2014 Residence Law No. 24 of 1973 on Residence and Foreigners' Affairs (amended 1998)	MoU with Bangladesh (2012) Agreement with Philippines (1988, 2006, 2012) Agreement with Indonesia (2009, suspended by Indonesia in 2015) Agreement with Pakistan (1978, 2007) MoU with Sri Lanka (2007) MoU with India (1986) Labour agreement with Egypt (1985, 2007) Labour agreement with Syria (2001) Kafala 'employer sponsorship system'	EU-Jordan Mobility Partnership Declaration (signed on 9 October 2014) Seven ILO labour conventions on the rights of migrant workers ILO Better Work Jordan programme ILO Integrated Programme on Fair Recruitment (FAIR) Migration and Governance Network (Magnet) programme	Residence and work permits compulsory (one year, renewable) Penalties for irregular migrants (irregular entries, stays) Registration with the Social Security Corporation even without a work permit Anti-trafficking law Discretionary treatment of illegal immigrants No naturalisation foreseen even after long-term residence



# ANNEX IV: GOVERNANCE FRAMEWORK – MAIN ACTORS

**TABLE 3: MAIN ACTORS INVOLVED IN EMIGRATION** 

Emigration processes	Relations with the diaspora
Family private/business networks Private recruitment firms and their representative association (ORCA) MoL: section (qism) of Employment Offices and Workers Abroad under the Employment Directorate, Labour Inspection Directorate MoFAE: Department (da'irat) of Expatriate Affairs MoE Ministry of Higher Education Universities	Royal Court MoFAE: Department (da'irat) of Expatriate Affairs MoL: Social Security Corporation Professional associations Expatriate associations Online portal of diaspora: http://connect.jo/

Source: ETF (2017), p. 12

#### TABLE 4: MAIN ACTORS INVOLVED IN THE IMMIGRATION OF FOREIGN LABOUR IN JORDAN

Immigration processes	Protection of workers' rights
MoL: Labour Migration Directorate Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Justice Domestic workers' private recruitment firms and their representative association Local NGOs and some international/UN organisations for fair recruitment Bilateral agreements between Jordan and sending countries Sponsorship of Jordanian nationals (employers)	MoL: Inspection Directorate Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Justice: National Anti-Trafficking Committee Trade Unions, e.g. General Trade Union of Workers in Textile, Garment and Clothing Industries Professional associations Local NGOs, e.g. ARDD, JOHUD International and UN organisations, e.g. ILO

Source: ETF (2017), p. 18

# TABLE 5: MAIN ACTORS INVOLVED IN THE SUPPORT OF REFUGEES/ASYLUM SEEKERS IN JORDAN

Support from Jordanian actors	Support from the international community
Ministry of Interior (Syrian Refugee Affairs Directorate) Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation (Humanitarian Relief Coordination Unit) Other line ministries and state institutions in specific areas (MoL, MoE, MoHE, MoH, municipalities, etc.) Jordan Response Platform for the Syria Crisis Community colleges (+ Al Quds private college) and universities Civil society organisations (i.e. JOHUD, ARDD, Jesuit Refugee Service)	EU provides funds for many international/national actors and EU Member States (GIZ, Danish Refugee Council, etc.) UNRWA for the Palestinian refugees UNHCR for other refugees Inter-Agency Task Force Other UN organisations involved with Syrian refugees' response (UNDP, UNICEF, UNESCO, ILO, International Organization for Migration (resettlement), UNFPA) International banks (World Bank, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, International Finance Corporation) International donors and NGOs (Norwegian Refugee Council, SDCooperation, Caritas, Care International, etc.)

Source: ETF (2017), p. 22



# LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

EDS Education Development Strategy

ETF European Training Foundation

EU European Union

FAIR Integrated Programme on Fair Recruitment

GCC Gulf Cooperation Council

GDP Gross domestic product

HIMS Household International Migration Survey

ICMPD International Centre for Migration Policy Development

ILO International Labour Organization

Magnet Migration and Governance Network

MISMES Migrant support measures from a skills and employment perspective

MoE Ministry of Education

MoFAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Expatriates

MoL Ministry of Labour

MoU Memorandum of Understanding

NES National Employment Strategy

NGO Non-governmental organisation

QIZ Qualifying Industrial Zone

SDC Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation

TVET Technical vocational education and training

UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization

UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

UNRWA United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East

USD United States dollars

VET Vocational education and training



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